“But, I Didn’t Mean to Hurt You”: Why the First Amendment Does Not Require Intent-to-Harm Provisions in Criminal “Revenge Porn” Laws by Foley, Katherine G.
Boston College Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 4 Article 7 
4-29-2021 
“But, I Didn’t Mean to Hurt You”: Why the First Amendment Does 
Not Require Intent-to-Harm Provisions in Criminal “Revenge Porn” 
Laws 
Katherine G. Foley 
Boston College Law School, katherine.foley.3@bc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and 
the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katherine G. Foley, “But, I Didn’t Mean to Hurt You”: Why the First Amendment Does Not Require Intent-to-
Harm Provisions in Criminal “Revenge Porn” Laws, 62 B.C. L. Rev. 1365 (2021), 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol62/iss4/7 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College 
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu. 
 
 1365 
“BUT, I DIDN’T MEAN TO HURT YOU”1: 
WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT 
REQUIRE INTENT-TO-HARM PROVISIONS 
IN CRIMINAL “REVENGE PORN” LAWS 
Abstract: Free speech protection under the First Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution is arguably one of the most essential rights that U.S. citizens hold. Since 
the founding of this country, a tension has existed between the government’s pro-
tection of free speech and an individual’s right to privacy. The Internet exacer-
bated this tension by providing an accessible avenue for the dissemination of pri-
vate images for all to see. Nonconsensual pornography and “revenge porn” are at 
the epicenter of this issue. Today, one in twelve adults in the United States will 
become a victim of nonconsensual pornography during their lifetime. Despite the 
pervasive role of nonconsensual pornography in modern society, most existing 
state criminal laws are narrowly drawn and, as a result, fail to protect most vic-
tims from these devastating attacks. State efforts to pass statutes that provide 
more comprehensive protections to victims’ privacy are routinely frustrated by 
constitutional challenges under the First Amendment. This Note discusses the 
two most prominent types of criminal nonconsensual pornography laws—
harassment-based statutes and privacy-based statutes— and explores the intersec-
tion between these laws and the First Amendment. This Note argues that, to suf-
ficiently protect all victims of nonconsensual pornography, states must adopt pri-
vacy-based laws with no intent-to-harm provisions. Finally, this Note argues that 
these privacy-based statutes do not violate the Constitution, because they make 
permissible content-neutral restrictions on speech that should survive intermedi-
ate scrutiny when challenged under the First Amendment. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Never ever in my life have I ever trusted anyone as much as I trusted my 
boyfriend,” said a Reddit user, a 24-year-old female, in her anonymous Reddit 
post from January 2020.2 The post, I Found Out That My Boyfriend Has Been 
Sharing My Nudes with His Father, detailed how the Reddit user confronted 
her boyfriend after she discovered that he sent naked photos of her to his father 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439, 449 (Ill. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 233 (2020); Brief 
of Defendant-Appellee Bethany Austin at 2–3, id. (No. 193910). 
 2 I ( 24F) Found Out That My ( 25M) Boyfriend Has Been Sharing My Nudes with His Father., 
REDDIT (Jan. 1, 2020, 9:12 PM), https://www.reddit.com/r/TwoXChromosomes/comments/eirnp9/i_
24f_found_out_that_my_25m_boyfriend_has_been/ [https://perma.cc/G4Y9-7APH]. 
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via text message.3 When the Reddit user mentioned the text exchange to her 
boyfriend, he explained that he sent the photos to brag about her body and their 
sex life.4 After expressing the violation and humiliation she felt, the Reddit 
user ended the post by sharing her uncertainty about pursuing legal action 
against her boyfriend.5 Unfortunately, even if the Reddit user wanted to bring 
criminal charges, she likely would not be able to.6 
Like the anonymous Reddit user, millions of Americans are victims of the 
sharing of their sexually explicit or nude images without their consent.7 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See id. The Reddit user, a girl in her mid-twenties, discovered the text messages when scrolling 
through her boyfriend’s phone. Id. In response to the photographs of her, her boyfriend’s father made 
commentary on her looks and body. Id. The Reddit user then confronted her boyfriend, and he ex-
plained that he was “completely devastated and genuinely fe[lt] terrible.” Erica Diaz, Woman Asks for 
Advice After Finding Out Her Boyfriend Has Been Sharing Her Nudes with His Father, PERCOLATE-
LY, https://percolately.com/erica/woman-advice-boyfriend-sharing-nudes-father/ [https://perma.cc/
W9ZQ-L6SE] [hereinafter Diaz, Woman Asks for Advice After Boyfriend Shared Her Nudes]; see also 
Jesus Diaz, What Is Reddit and How to Use It: The Definitive Guide, TOM’S GUIDE (July 22, 2019), 
https://www.tomsguide.com/reference/what-is-reddit [https://perma.cc/AW9Z-LQQE] (defining Red-
dit as conglomeration of online forums where users can post about any topic imaginable). 
 4 See I ( 24F) Found Out That My ( 25M) Boyfriend Has Been Sharing My Nudes with His Fa-
ther., supra note 2. In an updated post, the Reddit user explained that her boyfriend’s father always 
judged his son about the amount of sex that he had and judged his manhood off it. Diaz, Woman Asks 
for Advice After Boyfriend Shared Her Nudes, supra note 3. 
 5 See I ( 24F) Found Out That My ( 25M) Boyfriend Has Been Sharing My Nudes with His Fa-
ther., supra note 2. 
 6 See 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, 
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/8JQK-6LGC]. Today, forty-
eight states, Washington, D.C, and one U.S. territory have passed legislation that makes it illegal to 
disseminate a sexually explicit image of another without their consent. See id. (listing states with some 
form of nonconsensual pornography law). Out of those fifty statutes, thirty-six require that the perpe-
trator act with some form of an intent to harm the victim. See id.; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. 
§ 784.049(1)(b) (2020) (requiring the intent to cause “substantial emotional” harm to the victim); MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. § 3-809(c)(1) (West 2020) (requiring “the intent to harm, harass, intimidate, 
threaten or coerce” the victim); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3131(a) (2020) (requiring an “intent to harass, 
annoy or alarm” the victim); Amber Heard, Opinion, Amber Heard: Are We All Celebrities Now?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/opinion/amber-heard-revenge-
porn.html [https://perma.cc/B6UL-W2ZC] (illuminating how “revenge porn” laws that have intent-to-
harm provisions do not protect victims whose perpetrators acted without an intent to harm the victim). 
Currently, no federal law exists to protect victims from individuals who share private sexually explicit 
images without their consent. Nicole Goodkind, Katie Hill Could Finally Bring Pending Revenge 
Porn Bill in Congress to a Vote, FORTUNE (Oct. 29, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/10/29/katie-hill-
revenge-porn-bill-congress/ [https://perma.cc/YN2Y-CGH6]. 
 7 AMANDA LENHART ET AL., DATA & SOC’Y RSCH. INST., NONCONSENSUAL IMAGE SHARING: 
ONE IN 25 AMERICANS HAS BEEN A VICTIM OF “REVENGE PORN” 4, 6 (2016), https://datasociety.
net/pubs/oh/Nonconsensual_Image_Sharing_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2Z2-36L5]. A 2016 study 
of 3,002 American Internet users found that one in twenty-five Internet users was a victim of someone 
showing, sending, or posting a nude or nearly nude image of them without their consent. Id. at 6. To-
day, one in twenty-five equates to more than thirteen million people. See id.; U.S. and World Popula-
tion Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/6XUK-P7FQ] 
(Jan. 9, 2021) (equating that to approximately 13.2 million people out of 330 million people, which is 
the current U.S. population); see also Yanet Ruvalcaba & Asia A. Eaton, Nonconsensual Pornogra-
phy Among U.S. Adults: A Sexual Scripts Framework on Victimization, Perpetration and Health Cor-
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This phenomenon is known as nonconsensual pornography.8 Nonconsen-
sual pornography, more commonly referred to as “revenge porn,”9 is the dis-
semination of nude or sexually explicit images of another without their con-
sent.10 Although society is all too familiar with the common “revenge porn” 
storyline—a jilted ex-partner posts naked or sexually explicit photos or videos 
online of their ex-paramour11—most “revenge porn” cases are not rooted in 
revenge whatsoever.12 
                                                                                                                           
relates for Women and Men, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, Dec. 2018, at 1, 4 (finding, in a 2018 study, that one 
in twelve U.S. adults have been victims of nonconsensual pornography); Grace Williams, 4 Percent of 
Americans Have Been Victims of Revenge Porn, Report Says, FOX NEWS (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://www.foxnews.com/tech/4-percent-of-americans-have-been-victims-of-revenge-porn-report-
says [https://perma.cc/4ANQ-W2HR] (outlining the statistics resulting from the Data & Society Re-
search Institute’s study).  
 8 See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014) (defining nonconsensual pornography). 
 9 Id. at 345–46 (noting that “revenge porn” is used to refer to nonconsensual pornography). 
 10 Id.; Megan Fay, Note, The Naked Truth: Insufficient Coverage for Revenge Porn Victims at 
State Law and Proposed Federal Legislation to Adequately Address Them, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1839, 
1841 (2018) (noting that in many cases of nonconsensual pornography the victims create the images 
or give their consent for the images to be created, but then the perpetrator disseminates the images 
without the victims’ consent). For the purposes of this Note, the term nonconsensual pornography 
describes the broad definition of the publication or dissemination of sexually explicit images of anoth-
er without their consent. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5(a)–(b) (2020) (promulgating a broad 
definition of nonconsensual pornography). In contrast, in this Note, the term “revenge porn” denotes 
when an actor publishes or disseminates sexually explicit images of another without their consent and 
with the intent to harm the image’s subject. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2606(a) (West 2020) (requir-
ing a perpetrator act with an intent to harm their victim, thus asserting a narrower definition). 
 11 See Charlotte Alter, ‘It’s Like Having an Incurable Disease’: Inside the Fight Against Revenge 
Porn, TIME (June 13, 2017), https://time.com/4811561/revenge-porn/ [https://perma.cc/LCJ9-CUS9] 
(explaining the violations Kara Jefts felt when her ex-boyfriend emailed nude images of her to her 
family and friends and posted them on Internet sites accompanied by threats or falsities about her 
sexual history); Gabrielle Fonrouge, The Disturbing Story Behind NYC’s Revenge-Porn Perpetrators, 
N.Y. POST (Feb. 25, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/02/25/the-disturbing-story-behind-nycs-revenge-
porn-perpetrators/ [https://perma.cc/N3PG-K2BB] (detailing how a woman in Manhattan repeatedly 
found explicit images of herself across the Internet after her ex-boyfriend posted them online); Melis-
sa Jun Rowley, There Are Revenge Porn Laws on the Books in 46 States, but Victims Say Not Enough 
Is Being Done to Protect Them Online, INSIDER (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.insider.com/revenge-
porn-laws-katie-hill-chrissy-chambers-2019-11 [https://perma.cc/ECL5-4JRK] (describing how for-
mer U.S. congresswoman Katie Hill’s estranged husband posted sexually explicit photographs of her 
on the Internet).  
 12 See ASIA A. EATON ET AL., CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, 2017 NATIONWIDE ONLINE STUDY OF 
NONCONSENSUAL PORN VICTIMIZATION AND PERPETRATION: A SUMMARY REPORT 19 (2017), 
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CCRI-2017-Research-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XHW8-FKGH] (finding that approximately 80% of people who share private sexual 
images of another without their consent do not intend to harm the image’s subject); April Glaser, New 
York’s New Revenge Porn Bill Is a Bittersweet Victory, SLATE (July 25, 2019), https://slate.com/
technology/2019/07/revenge-porn-law-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/KD4S-ZAU3]. Attorneys and 
scholars argue that that not all perpetrators act with the intent to harm or harass their victims. Danielle 
Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Evaluating New York’s “Revenge Porn” Law: A Missed Opportunity to 
Protect Sexual Privacy, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/
evaluating-new-yorks-revenge-porn-law-a-missed-opportunity-to-protect-sexual-privacy/ [https://
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As of 2020, forty-eight states, Washington, D.C., and one U.S. territory 
have passed laws that criminalize nonconsensual pornography.13 Of those fifty 
statutes, most are harassment-based legislation that merely protects victims 
when their perpetrator acts with the intent to harm or harass.14 Although sever-
al states have passed privacy-based statutes, which provide more comprehen-
sive protection to all nonconsensual pornography victims, these statutes are 
more vulnerable to First Amendment challenges under the U.S. Constitution 
than harassment-based statutes.15 
This Note argues that privacy-based nonconsensual pornography laws do 
not run afoul of the First Amendment because they are content-neutral re-
strictions on speech subject to intermediate scrutiny.16 Part I of this Note pro-
vides an overview of the United States’ courts current framework for examin-
ing First Amendment challenges to speech restrictions.17 Part I additionally 
highlights the two definitions of nonconsensual pornography and explains how 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/D6ZZ-VEKR] (highlighting empirical evidence showing that 80% of actors do not dissemi-
nate sexually explicit images with the intent to harm); Glaser, supra. One incidence where perpetra-
tors did not carry an intent to harm their victims is evidenced in the 2017 U.S. Marines “revenge 
porn” scandal. Glaser, supra. In 2017, the War Horse, a nonprofit news organization, exposed a Face-
book group called Marines United, which hosted thousands of sexually explicit photos of female Ma-
rines and service members without their consent. Id. Despite the devastating harm to the female Ma-
rines resulting from the page and its exposure to the public, it is unlikely that the page’s thirty thou-
sand members explicitly intended to harm the female Marines. Thomas James Brennan, Hundreds of 
Marines Investigated for Sharing Photos of Naked Collogues, REVEAL (Mar. 4, 2017), https://reveal
news.org/blog/hundreds-of-marines-investigated-for-sharing-photos-of-naked-colleagues/ [https://
perma.cc/2KWJ-ND2Q] (noting that the Marines United page’s code of conduct required that mem-
bers do not engage in “threats, harm or harassment”); Glaser, supra. It was more likely that the mem-
ber-Marines “shar[ed] the photos for their own entertainment.” Glaser, supra. 
 13 See 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 6 (noting the 
one U.S. territory is Guam). 
 14 See id. Thirty-six states have harassment-based statutes, which require that the perpetrator 
acted with some intent to harm the person depicted in the image. Id.; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-1425(A) (2020) (stating that “[i]t is unlawful for a person to intentionally disclose an image of 
another” when the person depicted is in a state of nudity or engaged in sexual activities, “with the 
intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten or coerce the depicted person”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-
107(1)(a) (2020) (noting it is a crime to distribute, by “social media or any website,” a sexually explic-
it image “[w]ith the intent to harass, intimidate, or coerce the depicted person”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13, § 2606(b)(1) (criminalizing “knowingly disclos[ing]” a sexually explicit image of another without 
their consent, “with the intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the person depicted”). 
 15 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-189c(a) (2020) (stating that it is a misdemeanor to dissemi-
nate an intimate image without consent from the images subject, but not requiring that the perpetrator 
act with the intent to harm); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5(b) (requiring no intent to harm or harass 
on behalf of the criminal actor); see also Citron & Franks, supra note 12 (illustrating the forces that 
played into the creation of New York’s harassment-based nonconsensual pornography law that re-
quires an intent to harm the victim). See generally 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Re-
venge Porn Laws, supra note 6 (consolidating a list of state nonconsensual pornography laws enacted 
across the country). 
 16 See infra notes 244–293 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 22–82 and accompanying text. 
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state legislatures shape laws to reflect these differing definitions.18 Part II ex-
amines how U.S. courts’ First Amendment jurisprudence affects existing non-
consensual pornography laws challenged under the U.S. Constitution.19 Part III 
first argues that to adequately protect victims, states must pass broad privacy-
based nonconsensual pornography laws.20 Part III then argues that these priva-
cy-based nonconsensual pornography laws do not run afoul of the First 
Amendment because they are content-neutral restrictions on speech that should 
survive intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment.21 
I. FREE SPEECH: WHAT ARE ITS LIMITS UNDER NONCONSENSUAL 
PORNOGRAPHY LAWS? 
The Internet often operates as a double-edged sword.22 Since its incep-
tion, the Internet has created seemingly limitless opportunities for the dissemi-
nation of information, propelling society into the digital age.23 The intercon-
nectedness of the digital age, however, arms individuals with the ability to 
harm each other at magnitudes previously unimaginable.24 At the epicenter of 
this new-age harm is the use of the Internet for the dissemination of noncon-
sensual pornography.25 
Nonconsensual pornography is not a new phenomenon.26 Today, however, 
new technologies, including the Internet, assist actors in disseminating non-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 83–148 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 149–243 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 244–267 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 268–293 and accompanying text. 
 22 Scott R. Stroud, The Dark Side of the Online Self: A Pragmatist Critique of the Growing 
Plague of Revenge Porn, 29 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 168, 168 (2014). The Internet is a “dual-natured 
gift,” which allows users a unique outlet to facilitate and disseminate speech between more people 
than ever imagined. Id. The Internet’s “gift[s],” however, do not come without costs, especially be-
cause of users’ ability to transmit images of a personal and intimate nature with ease. Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Mudasir Kamal & William J. Newman, Revenge Pornography: Mental Health Implications 
and Related Legislation, 44 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 359, 359 (2016). The Internet allows users 
to conceive new mechanisms for harming others by enabling users to “widely disseminate false or 
private information” with ease. Id. Internet-related crime, including cyber-harassment, cyber-stalking, 
and cyber-hacking, occurs when perpetrators use the Internet to annoy, embarrass, or emotionally 
distress another individual. Id. at 359–60. 
 25 Id. at 359; Adrienne N. Kitchen, Note, The Need to Criminalize Revenge Porn: How a Law 
Protecting Victims Can Avoid Running Afoul the First Amendment, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 247, 249 
(2015) (emphasizing how new technologies exacerbate the harm from permanent privacy exposures, 
which leave victims feeling forever “branded” online (quoting Janice Richardson, If I Cannot Have 
Her Everybody Can: Sexual Disclosure and Privacy Law, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 
145, 159 (Janice Richards & Erika Rackley eds., 2012))). 
 26 See Alexa Tsoulis-Reay, A Brief History of Revenge Porn, N.Y. MAG. (July 19, 2013), https://
nymag.com/news/features/sex/revenge-porn-2013-7/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20190725234714/
http://nymag.com/news/features/sex/revenge-porn-2013-7/] (outlining the history of the publishing of 
nude or sexually explicit photos of others without their consent from 1980 to 2013). One of the first 
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consensual pornography globally with ease.27 Consequently, this expansion of 
platforms for dissemination exacerbates the harm that victims of nonconsensu-
al pornography face.28 Today, one in twelve adult Americans are victims of 
nonconsensual pornography.29 Despite the pervasive harms victims of noncon-
sensual pornography face, free speech advocates believe that a greater harm 
results when laws prohibiting the dissemination of nonconsensual pornography 
diminish the First Amendment rights of American citizens.30 As a result, an 
                                                                                                                           
documented, highly publicized incidences of nonconsensual pornography was in 1980 when Hustler 
Magazine published nude photos of women accompanied by falsities about their sexual history. Id.; 
see Ashby v. Hustler Mag., Inc, 802 F.2d 856, 857–58 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding the defendant, Hustler 
Magazine, liable for publishing a nude photo of the plaintiff, Urusula Ashby, without her consent); 
Wood v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1085–86 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding the defendant, Hustler 
Magazine, liable for publishing a stolen nude photograph of and false information about the plaintiff, 
Lajuan Wood, without her consent). 
 27 See Madeline Verge, Technology as an Enabler: ‘Revenge Porn’ and the Law, LAW SOC’Y, 
2017, at 1, 1–2. The sharing of explicit images with others was once limited to physical forms of im-
agery, but the use of technology now allows abusers to hurt their victims in a manner that fully en-
compasses their lives. Id. 
 28 See id.; see also, e.g., Annmarie Chiarini, Revenge Porn Almost Ruined My Life—Here’s How I 
Fought Back, REFINERY29 (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2017/04/150325/
revenge-porn-nude-photos-cyber-rights [https://perma.cc/Q8XL-AEW7]. In 2010, Annmarie Chia-
rini’s then-boyfriend threatened to sell naked images of her, which she previously took consensually, 
on eBay. Chiarini, supra. Her boyfriend sent auction links to Chiarini, her friends, her ex-husband, 
and her child’s babysitter, and then posted a link to the auction on Facebook. Id. Chiarini contacted 
Facebook, eBay, and Yahoo! and reported her then-boyfriend’s pages for two days straight. Id. He 
created new pages each time one was taken down. Id. For fourteen months Chiarini spent every night 
googling herself to ensure that her ex-boyfriend did not create additional posts. Id. In 2011, a porn 
website featured the nude photos of Chiarini and included her personal information, including her 
name, where she lived, and where she worked. Id. The website also posted solicitations for sex, sup-
posedly sent by Chiarini. Id. The porn website generated more than four thousand views in the first 
fourteen days. Id. After spending forty-eight hours reporting the account and doing “damage control,” 
Chiarini took a leave of absence from her job. Id. After several weeks of feeling like her torture would 
never end, she attempted suicide. Id. Chiarini stated that the experience was a horrifying violation of 
privacy, but she noted the worst harm was from the “permanence of the Internet” and the rape and 
death threats that she received and still receives today. Id.; see also Cara Bayles, With Online Revenge 
Porn, the Law Is Still Catching Up, LAW360 (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.law360.com/access-to-
justice/articles/1247863/with-online-revenge-porn-the-law-is-still-catching-up?carousel=1 [https://
perma.cc/E7MQ-XZP2]. Similarly, in 2018, an individual posted graphic sexual videos and photo-
graphs of Spring Cooper, along with her name, address, and links to her social media pages. Bayles, 
supra. She has spent most of her time since the incident reporting new posts of her images on various 
social media sites. Id. Due to the widespread reach of the images, Cooper has received countless inva-
sive online messages, threats, and harassment. Id.  
 29 Ruvalcaba & Eaton, supra note 7, at 1. The study focused on nonconsensual pornography ini-
tially created with the victim’s consent (i.e., the individuals took the photo or video themselves or 
consented to the image being taken or recorded) and subsequently distributed to others without the 
victim’s consent. See id. 
 30 John A. Humbach, The Constitution and Revenge Porn, 35 PACE L. REV. 215, 217 (2014) 
(arguing that “revenge porn” laws “fly directly in the face of free speech” by discriminating based on 
a speaker’s viewpoint); Lee Rowland, VICTORY! Federal Judge Deep-Sixes Arizona’s Ridiculously 
Overbroad ‘Nude Photo’ Law, ACLU (July 10, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/internet-
speech/victory-federal-judge-deep-sixes-arizonas-ridiculously-overbroad [https://perma.cc/F5AC-
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inherent tension exists between free speech and laws providing protection 
against nonconsensual pornography.31 
Part I of this Note addresses the intersection of free speech and noncon-
sensual pornography laws.32 Section A of this Part explores individuals’ First 
Amendment right to free speech and highlights both permissible and imper-
missible restrictions on speech under the U.S. Constitution.33 Section B of this 
Part describes the roots of nonconsensual pornography and its role in today’s 
society.34 Section C outlines the different legal definitions of nonconsensual 
pornography today, explaining both harassment-focused and privacy-focused 
definitions.35 Section C also discusses existing state laws that reflect these dif-
fering definitions of nonconsensual pornography.36 
A. First Amendment Doctrine: Content-Based & Content-Neutral 
Restrictions on Speech 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applicable to state gov-
ernments via the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, prohibits the 
enactment of laws that abridge an individual’s freedom of speech.37 Under the 
U.S. Constitution, no state government may validly restrict speech because of 
                                                                                                                           
K7QN] (arguing that protecting the U.S. Constitution and its amendments means “making tough 
calls” to oppose nonconsensual pornography laws that criminalize constitutionally protected speech). 
Some legal scholars assert that although there are certain enumerated exceptions to protected speech, 
legislatures should not be allowed to restrict speech whenever they deem that speech “too harmful to 
be tolerated.” Humbach, supra, at 220 (quoting Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 
(2011)). 
 31 See Adam Candeub, Nakedness and Publicity, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1773 (2018) (arguing 
that if we were to diminish First Amendment protection in the “revenge porn” context, it would create 
a slippery slope allowing legislatures to restrict speech in other instances, such as “gossip”); Evan 
Ribot, Comment, Revenge Porn and the First Amendment: Should Nonconsensual Distribution of 
Sexually Explicit Images Receive Constitutional Protection, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 521, 522, 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1646&context=uclf [https://perma. 
cc/SH5B-P6FG] (highlighting that newly passed “revenge porn” laws are facing growing resistance 
from free speech advocates who argue that these “new laws run afoul the First Amendment” to the 
U.S. Constitution); supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 37–148 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 37–82 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 83–97 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 110–119 and accompanying text (discussing the harassment-focused definition 
of nonconsensual pornography); infra notes 132–140 and accompanying text (discussing the privacy-
focused definition of nonconsensual pornography). 
 36 See infra notes 120–131 and accompanying text (highlighting examples of harassment-based 
state nonconsensual pornography laws); infra notes 141–148 and accompanying text (highlighting 
examples of privacy-based state nonconsensual pornography laws). 
 37 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting state or federal governments from passing laws that 
abridge individuals’ “freedoms concerning religion, expression, assembly, and the right to petition” 
the government for redress); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (noting that state 
governments are also bound by the constraints of the First Amendment). 
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the message or subject matter conveyed.38 These content-based restrictions, 
and the laws that impose such restrictions, are presumptively invalid under the 
First Amendment.39 Not all restrictions on speech, however, are content-based 
restrictions.40 The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that free speech restrictions 
may be content-neutral.41 This content distinction plays an integral role in First 
Amendment jurisprudence.42 In modern First Amendment cases, invalidity or 
validity of the law depends largely on whether the adjudicating court charac-
terizes a regulation as content-based or content-neutral.43 The following Sub-
sections highlight the distinctions between content-based and content-neutral 
restrictions on speech, and the varying degrees of scrutiny courts apply to such 
restrictions.44 
1. Content-Based Restrictions on Speech & Strict Scrutiny 
When adjudicating First Amendment challenges to state law, courts must 
first determine whether the state’s regulation of speech is a content-based or 
content-neutral restriction.45 A law is a content-based restriction on speech if 
the law applies to speech merely because of the topic, idea, or message ex-
pressed.46 For example, a law makes a content-based restriction on speech if 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See Reed, 576 U.S. at 163 (emphasizing that the Constitution prohibits state governments from 
enacting impermissible restraints on speech based on its content unless the restriction is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 
(1972) (same). 
 39 See Reed, 576 U.S. at 163–64; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 40 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (illustrating the difference be-
tween laws that make content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech). 
 41 See id. at 642–43 (asserting that content-neutral restrictions on speech may be constitutionally 
permissible). 
 42 Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based and 
Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 804 (2004). 
 43 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: 
Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 49–50 (2000) (delineating cases 
where the Court’s distinction of content-neutral and content-based regulations was outcome determi-
native). 
 44 See infra notes 45–62 and accompanying text (discussing content-based restrictions on speech 
subject to strict scrutiny); infra notes 63–82 and accompanying text (discussing content-neutral re-
strictions on speech subject to intermediate scrutiny). 
 45 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642 (requiring that courts look at the content distinc-
tion first before determining which level of scrutiny they will apply upon review of the law); Chemer-
insky, supra note 43, at 50, 54 (arguing that many free speech cases in the United States depend on 
the application of the content distinction). 
 46 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2015). In 2015, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a test to determine whether a regulation is content-based, requiring 
that a court consider whether a regulation of speech on its face draws distinctions based on the 
speech’s content, topic, idea or message. Id. Specifically, in Reed, the Town of Gilbert’s sign ordi-
nance prohibited individuals from displaying outdoor signs, depending on the message depicted on the 
sign itself. Id. at 155. The effect of the town’s ordinance prohibited a local church’s use of directional 
signs to advertise the location of its Sunday services. Id. As a result, the plaintiffs, the local church 
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the law specifically prohibits the destruction of the American flag but permits 
the destruction of another nation’s flag.47 There are two subgroups of content-
based restrictions on speech: (1) subject-matter restrictions and (2) viewpoint 
restrictions.48 A subject-matter restriction regulates speech based on the topic 
of the speech.49 A viewpoint restriction regulates speech based on the ideology 
of the message.50 
To determine if a law is generally content-based, a court must consider 
whether the regulation of speech draws distinctions, on its face, based on the 
subject-matter or viewpoint the speaker conveys.51 If a law regulates speech in 
either of these regards, the law is presumptively invalid under the Constitu-
tion.52 To rebut a presumption of invalidity, the government must prove that the 
regulation can survive strict scrutiny review by a court—the highest standard 
of review in U.S. jurisprudence.53 One could call strict scrutiny a “killing scru-
tiny” due to the Supreme Court’s rich history of overturning virtually every 
content-based restriction to which this exacting standard of review applied.54 
                                                                                                                           
and pastor, filed suit claiming that the defendant’s sign ordinance restricting the size, duration, and 
location of temporary directional signs violated the First Amendment. Id. The Court held that the 
town’s sign ordinance, which singled out signs bearing a particular message, was a content-based 
restriction on speech and invalid under the First Amendment. Id. at 171, 173. 
 47 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (overturning a state statute that restricted an 
individual’s ability to burn the American flag in protest). Other examples of content-based restrictions 
include prohibiting the display of signs that critique a foreign nation within a certain distance of a 
foreign embassy and prohibiting all picketing except for picketing on one particular topic. See, e.g., 
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (restricting the display of signs disparaging foreign govern-
ments within five hundred feet of the foreign embassy); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) 
(prohibiting individuals from residential picketing except for “peaceful labor picketing”). 
 48 See Chemerinsky, supra note 43, at 51. 
 49 See id. (articulating a subject-matter restriction as a content-based burden on speech). 
 50 See id. (specifying that a viewpoint restriction is a content-based regulation of speech). 
 51 See Reed, 576 U.S. at 163–64 (defining content-based restrictions on speech as laws that regu-
late speech by particular subject-matter or by its function or purpose). 
 52 See id. at 163 (establishing that content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional but may 
survive a constitutional challenge if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest); R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (same). 
 53 Reed, 576 U.S. at 163; Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (noting that the burden 
shifts to the government to prove that the statute will survive strict scrutiny review). 
 54 Patrick M. Garry, A New First Amendment Model for Evaluating Content-Based Regulation of 
Internet Pornography: Revising the Strict Scrutiny Model to Better Reflect the Realities of the Modern 
Media Age, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1595, 1598 (arguing that the current First Amendment doctrine does 
not allow content-based restrictions to be validly enacted); Adam Wrinkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict 
in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 807 
(2006) (emphasizing that application of this heightened scrutiny is “almost always fatal,” and referring 
to strict scrutiny as a “death knell” (first quoting Jeff Rubenfeld, The Anti-discrimination Agenda, 111 
YALE L.J. 1141, 1160 (2002); and then quoting CAROL M. SWAIN, THE NEW WHITE NATIONALISM IN 
AMERICA 269 (2002))); see, e.g., United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2003) 
(overturning restrictions on cable providers that regulated sexually explicit programming); Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (overturning a 
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Under existing First Amendment doctrine, laws that regulate speech based up-
on its content may be permitted if the government can prove that the construc-
tion of the statute is narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.55 
To ensure that content-based state statutes are narrowly tailored to the 
government interests they seek to serve, the Supreme Court developed a stand-
ard of strict scrutiny for reviewing statutory challenges under the First 
Amendment.56 To satisfy strict scrutiny, the government must satisfy a three-
part test.57 First, the government must show that there is a compelling state 
interest underlying the regulation.58 Second, the government bears the burden 
of showing that the regulation is “directly and substantially related to advanc-
ing” that interest.59 Finally, the government bears the additional burden of 
proving that the regulation employs the least restrictive means of achieving the 
state’s interest.60 
The strict scrutiny test aims to protect individuals’ right to free speech by 
ensuring that legislatures cannot impose restrictions on speech that are unnec-
essary to achieve a significant legislative interest.61 If a statute does not meet 
the requirements set forth in the strict scrutiny test, courts will hold it invalid 
under the Constitution and strike it down.62 
                                                                                                                           
law that regulated the earning of convicts who wrote books about their crimes); Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (overturning a law that restricted an individual’s ability to burn flags). 
 55 Reed, 567 U.S. at 163–64; Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 660 (noting that the burden shifts to the gov-
ernment to prove a statute’s constitutionality when the statute is initially presumptively invalid). 
 56 See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (introducing the test for 
the strict scrutiny standard). 
 57 R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate 
Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 293–94 (2016). 
 58 Id. at 294. First, the government must prove that the statute advances a “compelling or overrid-
ing government” objective. Id. 
 59 Id. For the government to prove that the statute is “directly and substantially related to advanc-
ing” the compelling objective, the regulation must assume the means that “directly advance” the gov-
ernment’s interest rather than substantially advance those interests. Id. at 294 n.16. For the law to 
prevail under the strict scrutiny analysis, the “direct relationship” between the regulation and the gov-
ernment’s interest is crucial. Id. (highlighting that in the First Amendment context, the government’s 
restriction on speech must be “actually necessary” to achieve the interest (quoting United States v. 
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012) (plurality opinion))). 
 60 Id. at 294. Finally, the government must show that the statute is the “least restrictive” yet still 
“effective means to advance” its objective. Id. 
 61 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (highlighting that the primary question a 
court needs to ask is whether the statute is the least restrictive means available to meet the govern-
ment’s goal). In 2004, in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the U.S. Supreme Court 
constructed this inquiry to ensure that states are not imposing restrictions that instill an unnecessary 
chilling effect on free expression. Id. 
 62 Id. at 660 (articulating that content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid and, if the gov-
ernment does not meet its burden of proof under the strict scrutiny inquiry, are unconstitutional). 
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2. Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech & Intermediate Scrutiny 
In contrast, content-neutral regulations on speech impose burdens, or con-
fer benefits, without reference to the idea, message, or viewpoint expressed.63 
For example, a regulation that prohibits individuals from posting any sign on 
public property makes a content-neutral restriction on speech because it does 
not distinguish based on the content of signs.64 To deem a law content-neutral, 
the court must find that the regulation serves a purpose unrelated to the content 
of the speech.65 If this inquiry reveals, however, that the government enacted a 
law to censor the view or message expressed, the law is considered content-
based rather than content-neutral.66 Despite this, a content-neutral law will not 
be considered content-based simply because it disparately affects some speak-
ers or topics but not others.67 As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in 1989 in 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, a court may deem a regulation content-neutral 
notwithstanding the law’s “incidental effect” on some expression.68 
The Supreme Court refers to these type of regulations as “time, place and 
manner” restrictions because they do not regulate the content that the messages 
express, but they merely regulate the manner of expression.69 For example, a 
content-neutral restriction of speech may require that protestors request a per-
mit before holding a demonstration or place zoning restrictions on the location 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (articulating the requirements 
that a court must consider to deem a statute to be content-neutral); see also Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that a regulation may serve a content-neutral purpose even 
if it has a peripheral effect on some speakers’ messages); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Re-
strictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48 (1987) (defining content-neutral laws). 
 64 Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) (up-
holding a city ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on city property). Some other examples of 
content-neutral laws include a law requiring an individual to obtain a permit before conducting an 
event with greater than fifty people in a public park and a law requiring all events in public parks to 
use city-approved speakers to reduce noise from concerts. See, e.g., Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 
U.S. 316, 325 (2002) (prohibiting gatherings of fifty people or more in public parks without a prior 
authorized permit); Ward, 491 U.S. at 803 (requiring the use of city-approved speakers to reduce noise 
levels within Central Park). 
 65 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (outlining that this inquiry is particularly salient in cases where the regu-
lation makes a “time, place, or manner” restriction on speech). To determine if the law is a content-
neutral restriction, courts must find that the government’s motive when enacting the law was not to 
regulate the message expressed. Id. 
 66 See id. (noting that the government’s underlying purpose for the regulation is the crucial factor 
for determining content-neutrality of a law). 
 67 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 480 (2014); Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
 68 491 U.S. at 791; McCullen, 573 U.S. at 480 (reaffirming the proposition that facially neutral 
laws may not be considered content-based because of some “disproportionate[] affects” on certain 
topics). 
 69 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 676 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Ward, 491 U.S. at 789, 789 (detailing that content-neutral laws may make 
valid regulations of speech on “time, place and manner”); see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 
576 (1941) (articulating the Supreme Court’s first recognition of valid “time, place and manner” re-
strictions on speech). 
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of adult theaters and shops.70 Because the regulation does not differentiate be-
tween types of speech—pro-life protests versus pro-choice protests, for exam-
ple—but instead regulates the location or timing of protests, the regulation is 
not considered a content-based restriction.71 Unlike content-based restrictions, 
content-neutral restrictions on speech are not presumptively invalid.72 Because 
content-neutral laws do not regulate what speakers are saying, they do not pose 
the same threat to individuals’ First Amendment rights and, as a result, are sub-
ject to a less-exacting level of scrutiny.73 Consequently, courts conduct judicial 
review of such restrictions under the less-stringent standard of intermediate 
scrutiny.74 
Despite this presumption of validity, a content-neutral law must survive 
the Supreme Court’s four-part intermediate scrutiny inquiry to be held consti-
tutionally valid.75 First, the restriction on speech must further a substantial 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 95-815, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS: 
EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf [https://
perma.cc/98VK-UVR4] (highlighting that courts held that zoning laws, regulating the location of 
sexually explicit businesses, are content-neutral); Huhn, supra note 42, at 806–07 (same); Kevin 
Francis O’Neill, Time, Place and Manner Restrictions, FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYC., https://www.
mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1023/time-place-and-manner-restrictions [https://perma.cc/73WE-
D25H] (observing that permit requirements for protest, parades, and demonstrations are routinely held 
to be content-neutral). 
 71 See, e.g., McCullen, 573 U.S. at 480–81 (declaring a law content-neutral because it prohibited 
anyone from intentionally standing within a certain distance of an abortion clinic, thus obstructing the 
entrance, but noting it made no distinctions based on a person’s purposes for being there). 
 72 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 645 (majority opinion). In 1994, in Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that for this 
presumption of validity to exist, the law cannot be a “subtle means of exercising a content prefer-
ence.” Id. 
 73 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amend-
ment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 789; Geoffrey R. Stone & Eugene Volokh, A Common 
Interpretation: Freedom of Speech and the Press, CONST. DAILY (Dec. 1, 2016), https://constitution
center.org/blog/a-common-interpretation-freedom-of-speech-and-the-press [https://perma.cc/F72P-
TVLM] (highlighting that content-neutral laws are “less threatening” to the First Amendment than 
content-based restrictions on speech). The intermediate scrutiny inquiry was first developed by the 
Supreme Court as a means for “weighing” the First Amendment rights of individuals against commu-
nity interests. Bhagwat, supra, at 788–89 (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 
(1943)). The inquiry resulted from a string of cases where the Supreme Court struck down laws that 
imposed burdens on individuals’ First Amendment rights but “did not involve flat censorship (in to-
day’s jargon, content-based regulations).” Id. at 788. The Court’s promulgation of the inquiry came as 
a compromise to allow states to impose some substantial burdens on speech. Id. at 788–89. 
 74 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (setting up the prereq-
uisites for applying the intermediate scrutiny analysis). 
 75 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (promulgating the original iteration of 
the intermediate scrutiny test for content-neutral restrictions on speech); see also Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989) (articulating the four-part intermediate scrutiny inquiry for 
“time, place and manner” restrictions of speech). The original intermediate scrutiny inquiry was 
promulgated under United States v. O’Brien, but the Supreme Court tailored the intermediate scrutiny 
test in Ward v. Rock Against Racism to evaluate “time, place, and manner” restrictions on speech. See 
Bhagwat, supra note 73, at 789, 791, 828 (highlighting that intermediate scrutiny under Ward encom-
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governmental interest.76 Second, the government bears the burden of showing 
that their interest is “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”77 Third, 
the regulation “must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s . . . inter-
est.”78 Unlike strict scrutiny, “narrow tailor[ing]” under intermediate scrutiny 
does not require that the state employ “the least restrictive . . . means” to serve 
the government’s interest.79 Rather, narrow tailoring is satisfied, so long as the 
restriction promotes a government’s substantial interest that would be 
“achieved less effectively” without the restriction.80 Finally, to fully satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny, the state must show that the restriction leaves open “am-
ple alternative channels of communication,” such as another legally permissi-
ble method to engage in the same expression.81 If the state meets this burden of 
                                                                                                                           
passes the O’Brien test by incorporating a version of “narrow tailoring” designed to meet the less-
exacting demands of intermediate scrutiny). 
 76 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 798; Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. In some instances, the Supreme Court 
blended the first and third prong of this test by requiring that the restriction is “narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant governmental interest.” See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. In 
each case, however, the inquiry requires the state to identify a substantial government interest at the 
onset. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 662; Ward, 491 U.S. at 783; Clark, 468 U.S. at 296. 
 77 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377); Ward, 491 U.S. 
at 791 (requiring that the regulation be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech” (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293)). 
 78 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 662; Ward, 491 U.S. at 798. 
 79 Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 (rejecting the requirement that the state use the “least restrictive means” 
to regulate speech); Bhagwat, supra note 73, at 789, 828 (emphasizing that Supreme Court clarified 
that “narrow tailoring” does not require that the state use “least restrictive means” to achieve their 
interest); see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 218 (2014) (plurality opinion). In 2014, in 
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that in every case, even 
when applying a less-exacting level of scrutiny, the laws must fit the government’s purpose. 572 U.S. 
at 218. The Court explained that under intermediate scrutiny, this does not require the “least restrictive 
means,” but the law must be reasonably narrowly tailored to achieve the legislature’s goal. Id. (quot-
ing Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)); see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
576 U.S. 155, 175 n.* (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that even content-neutral restrictions on 
speech “must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests,” but 
do not need to meet the exacting standard that content-based restrictions must meet (quoting Ward, 
491 U.S. at 798)). 
 80 Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). In other 
words, narrow tailoring under intermediate security requires that the time, place, and manner regula-
tion does not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legiti-
mate interest.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). 
 81 Ward, 491 U.S. at 789, 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293) (highlighting that this channels 
inquiry is especially salient in cases where the restriction is a “time, place and manner” restriction on 
speech (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293)); see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000) (finding that 
“when a content-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may 
satisfy the tailoring requirement”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 662 (articulating that the 
O’Brien test for intermediate scrutiny requires that the state shows any incidental restriction on First 
Amendment freedoms is “no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest” (quoting 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377)). 
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proof under intermediate scrutiny, a court will uphold the content-neutral re-
striction as a constitutionally permissible restriction on speech.82 
B. Nonconsensual Pornography’s Pervasive Role in Society 
The exchange of sexually explicit images is not new in the Internet Age.83 
But the innovative technology that expanded avenues for speech also magni-
fied the reach of nonconsensual pornography throughout modern society.84 
Snapchat,85 which launched in September of 2011, is now synonymous with 
sexting.86 In modern relationships, sexting serves as a method by which ro-
mantic partners routinely converse with one another.87 A 2016 study found that 
21% of adults ranging from ages twenty-one to seventy-five reported sending 
sexually explicit text messages, and 28% of adults reported being on the re-
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 803 (upholding a content-neutral restriction on speech that satisfied the 
intermediate scrutiny inquiry); Clark, 468 U.S. at 299 (same). 
 83 See Rachel Thompson, For Better or Worse, Snapchat Changed Sexting Forever, MASHABLE 
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/02/07/snapchat-sexting-revolution/ [https://web.archive.
org/web/20201112034925/https://mashable.com/2017/02/07/snapchat-sexting-revolution/?europe=
true]. Exchanging sexually explicit images is not a phenomenon that is unique to the digital era; its 
roots date back to Paleolithic cave paintings, but its emergence in everyday society exploded in the 
2000s when smartphones became commonplace. Id. Today, this exchange most frequently takes form 
as sexting. Id. Sexting is defined as “the sending of sexually explicit messages or images by cell 
phone.” Sexting, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014). Sexting is more colloquially 
used, however, as a catch-all term for any communication of sexually explicit material between two 
individuals (either by cell phone or other means). Dena Sacco et al., Sexting: Youth Practices and Legal 
Implications 1, 3 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y Harv. Univ., Research Publication No. 2010-8, 
2010), https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2010/Sexting_Youth_Practices_Legal_Implications [https://
perma.cc/SC4K-L6JP]. 
 84 Swathi Krishna, Sexting: The Technological Evolution of the Sexual Revolution, PSYCHIATRIC 
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/special-reports/sexting-technological-
evolution-sexual-revolution [https://perma.cc/4PVX-Z8SU] (highlighting that the rise of the Internet 
and smartphones increased sexting among adults and youth). Sexting today has become a routine 
practice for couples and is a “natural marriage of [traditional] forms of sexual expression and modern 
day technology.” Id.; VOA Student Union, Snapchat Fueled the Explosion of Sexting, Study Says, 
VOA NEWS (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.voanews.com/student-union/snapchat-fueled-explosion-
sexting-study-says [https://perma.cc/A3G9-74Y7] (noting that the popularity Snapchat led to an ex-
plosion in rates of sexting, especially amongst youths). 
 85 VOA Student Union, supra note 84. Snapchat is a smartphone app that allows users to send 
temporary photos to one another. See id. The app deletes photos after a maximum of ten seconds. Id. 
Today, however, there are many ways to save these seemingly temporary photos, even without notify-
ing the sender. Id. 
 86 See Thompson, supra note 83 (emphasizing that Snapchat’s inception in 2011 radically 
changed the nature of cell phone use forever). 
 87 See id. (arguing that Snapchat transformed the consensual act of sharing intimate photos from a 
“stigmatized and seedy activity” to a typical way that partners communicate with one another); see 
also Jeff R. Temple et al., Comment, Sexting in Youth: Cause for Concern?, 3 LANCET: CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 520, 520 (2019). In one study, researchers found that adolescents’ exploration 
of their sexual identity serves as a developmental and biological imperative. Temple et al., supra, at 
520–21. The study encourages individuals to look at sexting as “healthy relating” to a significant 
other. Id. at 521. 
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ceiving end.88 But sexting is not just limited to adults.89 In 2018, a study on 
youth sexting habits showed that approximately 15% of adolescents, ages twelve 
to seventeen, were sending sexts, and 27% of youth were receiving them.90 
Although sexting may be harmless when it occurs between two consent-
ing individuals, there is an inherent risk in divesting control over a sexually 
revealing image.91 There are two classes of sexting: “primary sexting” and 
“secondary sexting.”92 “Primary sexting” occurs when the subject of the sex-
ually explicit photo sends the photo of themselves to others willingly.93 “Sec-
ondary sexting” is when a person receives a photo from the subject or a third 
party, and then they further distribute the photo to additional third parties.94 
Approximately twenty-three percent of adults that received sexually explicit 
images reported sharing the images with others in a 2016 survey.95 Amongst 
teens, more than one in ten reported forwarding a sext without consent, and 
one in twelve reported having a sext they sent shared without their consent.96 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Justin R. Garcia et al., Sexting Among Singles in the USA: Prevalence of Sending, Receiving 
and Sharing Sexual Messages and Images, 13 SEXUAL HEALTH 428, 428 (2016). 
 89 Sheri Madigan et al., Prevalence of Multiple Forms of Sexting Behavior Among Youth: A Sys-
temic Review and Meta-Analysis, 172 JAMA PEDIATRICS 327, 328, 331 (2018). A meta-analysis of 
thirty-nine studies concerning youth sexting habits indicated that the average percentages for youths 
sending and receiving sexts were 14.8% and 27.4%, respectively. Id. at 331. The mean age of partici-
pants in the thirty-nine studies was 15.16 years. Id. at 327. 
 90 Id. at 327, 331. 
 91 Thompson, supra note 83. Sexting exposes individuals to the danger of becoming a “revenge 
porn” victim. Id. Although platforms used for sexting, like Snapchat, delete photos once the recipient 
opens the image, there are mechanisms for users to capture the image and save it for later use without 
notifying the sender. Christine Elgersma, Parents Ultimate Guide to Snapchat, COMMON SENSE ME-
DIA (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/blog/parents-ultimate-guide-to-snapchat 
[https://perma.cc/7MN3-Q4KA] (highlighting that the use of third-party apps to capture a snapchat 
image will not notify the sender that their message has been captured or screen-grabbed); Thompson, 
supra note 83. According to social media expert Blaise Grimes-Viort people that engage in sexting 
run the risk that the “no-saving” and “no-sharing” agreement between them and their sexting partner 
“will not be respected.” Thompson, supra note 83.  
 92 Elizabeth M. Ryan, Note, Sexting: How the State Can Prevent a Moment of Indiscretion from 
Leading to a Lifetime of Unintended Consequences for Minors and Young Adults, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
357, 360–61 (2010). Sexting “involves four different roles: (1) the subject of the photo, (2) ‘the person 
who took the photo,’ (3) ‘the distributor(s) of the photo,’ and (4) ‘the recipient(s) of the photo.’” Id. 
(quoting Policy Statement on Sexting, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD. (Sept. 21, 
2009), https://web.archive.org/web/20101224041342/http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/
servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=4130). Under this framework, a single 
actor may take on several roles (i.e., if the subject of the photo takes a nude photo of themselves and 
sends it to another, they assume the first three roles), but it is also very common for “multiple actors 
[to] assume a single role” (i.e., when a photo is sent or forwarded to many recipients). See id. 
 93 Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell Phones, Privacy, and the First Amendment: When Children Become 
Child Pornographers and the Lolita Effect Undermines the Law, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 30 
(2009) (referring to primary sexting also as “initial” sexting); Ryan, supra note 92, at 361. 
 94 Calvert, supra note 93, at 30 (referring to secondary sexting as “downstream sexting” due to 
the photo reaching further recipients); Ryan, supra note 92, at 361. 
 95 Garcia et al., supra note 88, at 428. 
 96 Madigan et al., supra note 89, at 331. 
1380 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1365 
When a sexually explicit image escapes the privacy of the initial recipient’s 
purview, without the depicted person’s consent, secondary sexting transforms 
into nonconsensual pornography.97 
C. Harassment v. Privacy: Differing Definitions of  
Nonconsensual Pornography 
Nonconsensual pornography is the dissemination or sharing of sexually 
explicit images of another without their consent.98 Although there is no con-
sensus on a legal definition of nonconsensual pornography, all definitions cen-
ter on the lack of the victim’s consent to dissemination.99 The different defini-
tions for nonconsensual pornography, however, are directly reflected in the 
laws that criminalize this conduct.100 
As of 2020, fifty statutes are in effect criminalizing the distribution of 
nonconsensual pornography.101 These statutes vary in their construction and, 
consequently, provide varying degrees of protection for victims.102 Out of the 
fifty existing statutes, thirty-six consider nonconsensual pornography a form of 
criminal harassment.103 Of the few remaining criminal statutes, some catego-
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Mitchell Osterday, Note, Protecting Minors from Themselves: Expanding Revenge Porn 
Laws to Protect the Most Vulnerable, 49 IND. L. REV. 555, 560–61 (2016) (suggesting that once an 
image is published on the internet, the purview of sexting ends and the image sharing becomes “re-
venge porn”); Ryan, supra note 92, at 362 (arguing that the state should impose penalties even on 
minors who engage in “secondary sexting”). 
 98 Citron & Franks, supra note 8, at 346. 
 99 Clay Calvert, Revenge Porn and Freedom of Expression: Legislative Pushback to an Online 
Weapon of Emotional and Reputational Destruction, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
673, 676–77 (2015) (focusing on the lack of consent to subsequent forwarding or disseminations of the 
image as the common element found in definitions of nonconsensual pornography). 
 100 See 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 6. 
 101 See id. (noting that Guam has also outlawed this conduct). 
 102 See Heard, supra note 6 (arguing that many laws enacted to combat this issue cover “revenge 
porn,” but noting there are other types of harms that fall on the continuum of image-based sexual 
abuse). 
 103 See 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 6; see also 
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425(A) (2020) (noting that “[i]t is unlawful for a person to inten-
tionally disclose an image of another” where the person depicted is nude or engaged in sexual activi-
ties “with the intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten or coerce the depicted person”); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107(1)(a) (West 2020) (stating that it is a crime to distribute, by “social media or 
any website,” a sexually explicit image “[w]ith the intent to harass, intimidate, or coerce the depicted 
person”); MO. REV. STAT. § 573.110(2) (2020) (prohibiting the intentional dissemination of an image 
of a person “who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed” with the “intent to 
harass, threaten, or coerce” the person); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:9-a(II) (2020) (criminalizing the 
purposeful dissemination of an image of a person “who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate 
parts are exposed” with the intent to “harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the depicted person”); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2606(b)(1) (West 2020) (criminalizing knowingly disclosing a sexually explicit 
image of another without their consent and “with the intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, or 
coerce the person depicted”). 
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rize the dissemination of nonconsensual pornography as a breach or invasion 
of privacy.104 
For the purposes of this Note, it is important to understand the divergent 
definitions of nonconsensual pornography,105 the interests that these definitions 
protect,106 and how these definitions create a split in existing laws.107 The fol-
lowing Subsections highlight these definitions108 and the laws shaped in their 
likeness.109 
1. A Harassment-Focused Definition of Nonconsensual Pornography 
A harassment-focused definition of nonconsensual pornography closely 
tracks the traditional social understanding of “revenge porn.”110 Harassment-
based statutes define nonconsensual pornography as the dissemination of a 
sexually explicit image of another, without their consent, and with the intent to 
harm the person depicted.111 The key feature of this definition is the intent-to-
                                                                                                                           
 104 See 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 6; see also 
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-189c(a), (c) (2020) (declaring that it is a misdemeanor to disseminate 
an intimate image without consent from the image’s subject, but not requiring that the perpetrator act 
with the intent to harm the victim); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(9) (West 2020) (prohibiting the 
act of “[k]nowingly reprodu[ing], distribut[ing], exhibit[ing], publish[ing], transmit[ting], or otherwise 
disseminat[ing] a visual depiction of a person who is nude or is engaging in sexual conduct . . . with-
out the consent of the person depicted,” but not requiring the perpetrator to have an intent to harm or 
harass the person depicted); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5 (2020) (requiring no intent to harm or 
harass on behalf of the criminal actor). Some laws, however, only target instances of “video voyeur-
ism,” when a perpetrator records, without consent, a person in the nude, or engaging in sexually ex-
plicit activity. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609(2) (West 2020) (stating that it is a crime in 
install or permit the use of an imagining device in a place where a person would have “reasonable 
expectation of privacy”). 
 105 See infra notes 110–148 and accompanying text (highlighting the distinctions between a har-
assment-focused and privacy-focused definition of nonconsensual pornography). This Note focuses on 
two ways of characterizing nonconsensual pornography: (1) as a form of harassment and (2) as a 
breach of privacy. See infra notes 110–131 (discussing nonconsensual pornography as a form of har-
assment); 132–148 (discussing nonconsensual pornography as a breach of privacy). 
 106 See infra notes 110–148 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 110–148 and accompanying text. 
 108 See infra notes 110–119, 132–140 and accompanying text. 
 109 See infra notes 120–131, 141–148 and accompanying text. 
 110 Tegan S. Starr & Tiffany Lavis, Perceptions of Revenge Pornography and Victim Blame, 12 
INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 427, 427 (2018) (recognizing that the common understanding of non-
consensual pornography is instances of “revenge porn” where individuals, seeking revenge after a 
breakup, leak intimate images of their ex-partner online). 
 111 See 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 6. There are 
variations of the harassment-focused definition that include more language than the intent-to-harm. 
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425(A) (2020) (requiring that a person disclose the image 
with the “intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten or coerce the depicted person”); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107(1)(a)(I) (West 2020) (requiring the “intent to harass, intimidate, or coerce the 
depicted person”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2606(b)(1) (West 2020) (requiring the “intent to harm, 
harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the person depicted, and the disclosure would cause a reasona-
ble person to suffer harm”); Glaser, supra note 12 (urging that a harassment-focused definition of 
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harm clause, which narrows the definition of nonconsensual pornography.112 
Under such, the actions of perpetrators who do not intend to harm or harass, 
but are motivated by some other purpose, such as entertainment, bragging, fi-
nancial gain, or sexual gratification, are not criminalized.113 
In 2014, in Antigone Books L.L.C. v. Brnovich, the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (ACLU) on behalf of the plaintiffs, various booksellers, authors, 
publishers and media organizations, challenged Arizona’s law addressing non-
consensual pornography.114 In the suit, the ACLU expressed its concern that 
the broadly defined Arizona statute would criminalize innocent actors, and it 
demanded that the state legislatures redefine the crime with an intent-to-harm 
element.115 The suit alleged that without this intent-to-harm provision, the Ari-
zona statute was not constitutionally sound because it ran afoul of the First 
Amendment.116 
Free speech proponents, like the ACLU, champion a narrow harassment-
focused statutory definition of nonconsensual pornography because it does not 
                                                                                                                           
nonconsensual pornography is less effective in defining this conduct because it is narrowed through 
an intent-to-harass clause). For the purposes of this Note, the phrase “intent-to-harm” encompasses all 
variations of the harassment definition. See infra notes 112–131 (discussing harassment-based laws 
that feature some variation of an intent-to-harm provision). 
 112 Glaser, supra note 12 (noting that intent-to-harm or -harass clauses create harassment-focused 
definitions of nonconsensual pornography). 
 113 Id. Most cases of nonconsensual sharing of sexual images do not fall into this definition of 
harassment because the individual distributing the photos does not always want to cause some type of 
harm to the person depicted in these images. Id.; Carrie Goldberg, Seven Reasons Illinois Is Leading 
the Fight Against Revenge Porn, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.cybercivil
rights.org/seven-reasons-illinois-leading-fight-revenge-porn/ [https://perma.cc/7X4L-KAMP]. A 
plethora of other reasons, including entertainment, sexual gratification, or financial gain, motivate 
perpetrators of nonconsensual pornography. Goldberg, supra; see, e.g., Diaz, Woman Asks for Advice 
After Boyfriend Shared Her Nudes, supra note 3 (highlighting that some individuals share nonconsen-
sual pornography to brag about their partner’s looks and body); I ( 24F) Found Out That My ( 25M) 
Boyfriend Has Been Sharing My Nudes with His Father., supra note 2 (same). 
 114 See Final Decree at 1–2, Antigone Books L.L.C. v. Brnovich, No. 14-cv-02100 (D. Ariz. July 
10, 2015) (settling the case amongst the parties and subsequently halting enforcement of Arizona’s 
statute); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Antigone Books L.L.C. v. Brnovich, 
No. 14-cv-02100 (D. Ariz. filed Sept. 23, 2014) (suing to change the law from a privacy-focused defi-
nition of nonconsensual pornography to a harassment-focused one). 
 115 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 114, at 4; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-1425(A) (2014) (amended 2016) (making it unlawful to “intentionally disclose, display, 
distribute, publish, advertise or offer a photograph, videotape, film or digital recording of another 
person in a state of nudity or engaged in specific sexual activities if the person knows or should have 
known that the depicted person has not consented to the disclosure”). Arizona’s criminal law defines 
“[s]pecific sexual activities” as “[h]uman genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal” and 
“[s]ex acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, including acts of human masturbation, sexual 
intercourse, oral copulation or sodomy” for purposes of the nonconsensual pornography statute. ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-811(E)(18)(a)–(b) (2020). 
 116 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 114, at 5 (arguing that the Arizo-
na statute unduly burdened the free speech rights of Arizona citizens because of the law’s over-
breadth). 
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threaten First Amendment rights.117 The ACLU, along with other advocates of 
free speech, argue that offenders must engage in some sort of “revenge” for 
their actions to constitute nonconsensual pornography.118 They fear that a 
broader definition, not requiring revenge, will chill free speech and punish in-
nocent actors.119 
The majority of states that have enacted legislation pertaining to noncon-
sensual pornography adopt a harassment-focused definition.120 The common 
feature amongst harassment-based nonconsensual pornography laws is that 
they incorporate some form of an intent-to-harm provision to define criminal 
culpability.121 
Most recently, in July of 2019, New York adopted a harassment-based 
nonconsensual pornography statute.122 The New York statute defines noncon-
sensual pornography as a crime when the actor disseminates or publishes an 
“intimate image” of another without their consent and “with [the] intent to 
cause harm to the emotional, financial or physical welfare of another per-
son.”123 The statute employs a harassment-focused definition of nonconsensual 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Press Release, ACLU, Judge Halts Enforcement of Unconstitutional Nude Photo Law in 
Arizona (July 10, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/judge-halts-enforcement-unconstitutional-
nude-photo-law-arizona [https://perma.cc/2M53-7HRU]. The ACLU argues that a limitation on a 
broad definition of nonconsensual pornography is an important vindication for the First Amendment. 
Id.; see also Mary Anne Franks, The ACLU’s Frat House Take on ‘Revenge Porn,’ HUFFPOST (June 
1, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-aclus-frat-house-take_b_6980146 [https://perma.cc/
N7PF-8HUV] (explaining that the ACLU insists upon a definition that requires a “perpetrator[] act 
with the intent to harass [or harm] their victims”). 
 118 See Rowland, supra note 30 (urging that laws without an intent-to-harm requirement can vio-
late the First Amendment). Lee Rowland, the ACLU’s Senior Staff Attorney, argues that all “revenge 
porn” laws should have an intent element to pass “constitutional muster.” Id.; see Franks, supra note 
117; see also Christopher Vondracek, Free Speech Advocates Losing Legal Challenges Against Re-
venge Porn, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/dec/31/
free-speech-advocates-losing-legal-challenges-agai/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20210220053747/
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/dec/31/free-speech-advocates-losing-legal-challenges-
agai/] (noting, Raleigh Levine, a law professor, argued that the expansive privacy-based nonconsensu-
al pornography laws violate the First Amendment due to their “sweep” and application to persons who 
do not have malicious intent). 
 119 See Daysia Tolentino, Revenge Porn Laws Face an Unexpected Civil Rights Obstacle: The 
First Amendment, MUCKROCK NEWSL. (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/
2018/dec/06/first-amendment-vs-revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/TTG3-MQKJ]. The ACLU 
argues that legislatures cannot pass nonconsensual pornography laws that ignore the constraints of the 
First Amendment. Id.; see Rowland, supra note 30 (expressing concern that broadly written “revenge 
porn” laws may criminalize the actions of innocent actors like “booksellers, photographers, publish-
ers, and librarians” who can face felonious charges for publishing sexually explicit images). 
 120 See 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 6. 
 121 See id. 
 122 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.15(1)(a) (McKinney 2020) (requiring that a perpetrator of non-
consensual pornography act with an “intent to cause harm to the emotional, financial or physical wel-
fare” of the person depicted in the image). 
 123 Id. The intent-to-harm provisions in the New York statute are unique because they go beyond 
the mere intent-to-harm language found in most nonconsensual pornography laws. See id. Unlike 
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pornography because it limits criminal liability only to actors that carry an in-
tent to harm their victims emotionally, physically, or financially when dissemi-
nating these types of images.124 
Similarly, Arizona’s nonconsensual pornography statute, adopted in 2016, 
serves as a guideline for states seeking to enact nonconsensual pornography 
statutes.125 After the ACLU’s suit halted enforcement of Arizona’s original 
nonconsensual pornography law,126 Arizona’s legislature redrafted the statute 
to account for its constitutional deficiencies.127 Today, Arizona’s “revenge 
                                                                                                                           
other nonconsensual pornography statutes, the New York law defines harm in terms of “emotional, 
financial or physical” harms. Id. Compare id. (focusing on an intent to harm to the victim’s “emotion-
al, financial or physical welfare” to define criminal culpability), with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 2606(b)(1) (West 2020) (requiring an “intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce” the 
victim to define criminal culpability). In addition, the New York statutory scheme also allows victims 
to seek both criminal and civil action against the perpetrator. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 52-b (McKin-
ney 2020) (permitting victims to bring a private right of action against their perpetrators); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 245.15(1) (serving as a mechanism for victims to bring criminal charges against their perpetra-
tor). 
 124 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.15(1)(A) (containing an intent-to-harm provision); see also Gla-
ser, supra note 12 (defining the harassment-based statute as one that includes some form of an intent-
to-harm clause). 
 125 See Monica Lindstrom, Legally Speaking: What Arizona’s Modified Revenge Porn Laws Mean 
for Jilted Lovers, KTAR NEWS (Mar. 14, 2016), https://ktar.com/story/963033/legally-speaking-what-
arizonas-modified-revenge-porn-law-means-for-jilted-lovers/ [https://perma.cc/B99Y-B9YS] (ex-
plaining the modifications made to Arizona’s nonconsensual pornography law and encouraging other 
states to enact similar types of laws). 
 126 See Final Decree, supra note 114, at 1–2 (stopping Arizona state prosecutors from enforcing 
the 2014 version of the law); Press Release, ACLU, supra note 117 (noting that in July of 2015, a 
federal court permanently halted the enforcement of Arizona’s 2014 nonconsensual pornography law); 
Brian Strong, Arizona’s Revenge Porn Law Remains on Indefinite Hold, AZ LEGAL (Sept. 16, 2015), 
https://www.azlegal.com/arizonas-revenge-porn-law/ [https://perma.cc/9HB8-VGLQ]. The procedural 
history of Antigone Books L.L.C. v. Brnovich began in November of 2014, when the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Arizona permanently ordered Arizona to abandon enforcement of the 2014 
version of Arizona’s nonconsensual pornography law. Strong, supra. In 2015, the legislature sought to 
draft a new constitutionally appropriate version of the law, but it still contained language that was 
constitutionally impermissible. Id. In July of 2015, the Arizona District Court entered a final decree 
preventing Arizona prosecutors from enforcing the 2015 revised statute. See Final Decree, supra note 
114, at 1–2; Press Release, ACLU, supra note 117. 
 127 Ryan Van Velzer, Senate Passes Bill Revising 2014 ‘Revenge Porn’ Law, ARIZ. CAPITOL 
TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016), https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2016/03/07/senate-passes-bill-revising-2014-
revenge-porn-law/ [https://perma.cc/68XE-UWS4]. In 2016, the Arizona legislature passed the final 
iteration of its nonconsensual pornography law that made it a crime to share nude images of another 
person with the intent to hurt someone. Id. The ACLU supported the revised bill, expressing that the 
statute now is tailored in its application and limited to the behavior it originally intended to criminal-
ize. Id.; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425 (2014) (amended 2016). The original Arizona statute 
made it illegal to “intentionally disclose, display, distribute, publish, advertise or offer a photograph, 
videotape, film, or digital recording of another person in a state of nudity or engaged in specific sexual 
activities if the person knows or should have known that the depicted person has not consented to the 
disclosure.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425(A). This original version did not contain the “intent to 
harm, harass, intimidate, threaten or coerce the depicted person” clause that is featured in the most 
current version of the statute. Compare id. (lacking an intent-to-harm provision), with ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-1425(A)(3) (2020) (featuring an intent-to-harm clause). 
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porn” statute requires the disseminator act without the consent of and with “the 
intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten or coerce” the person depicted to 
establish criminal culpability.128 
Although both Arizona’s and New York’s narrow construction of noncon-
sensual pornography does not threaten First Amendment rights under the Con-
stitution,129 it narrows the pool of victims that can find recourse under state 
criminal law.130 As a result, many activists and researchers have called for a 
broader definition of nonconsensual pornography, one that focuses on the vic-
tim’s privacy rather than the intent of the disseminator.131 
2. A Privacy-Focused Definition of Nonconsensual Pornography 
A privacy-focused definition of nonconsensual pornography encompasses 
all types of nonconsensual disclosure of sexually explicit images of another 
when the photos are taken with the expectation of privacy.132 Unlike a harass-
                                                                                                                           
 128 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425(A)(3) (2020) (emphasis added). 
 129 See Tolentino, supra note 119 (discussing the effects of intent-to-harm provisions on court’s 
constitutional rulings). The differences between two nonconsensual pornography statutes, Vermont’s 
and Texas’s, that were challenged in 2015 under the First Amendment highlight why the respective 
courts reached different outcomes. Id. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the Vermont statute 
“respect[ed] the right to free” speech because it contained an intent-to-harm clause. Id.; see also VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2606 (West 2018). In contrast, the Twelfth Court of Appeals of Texas, conclud-
ed the Texas statute, containing no intent-to-harm provision, was too broad to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. Tolentino, supra note 119; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16 (West Supp. 2017) 
(amended 2019), invalidated by Ex parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346, 2018 WL 2228888 (Tex. Ct. App. 
May 16, 2018). 
 130 Glaser, supra note 12. Under the New York law, victims of this type of attack would have no 
recourse if their perpetrator disseminated the sexually explicit photos for another purpose other than 
the one enumerated in the statute. Id. 
 131 Heard, supra note 6. Amber Heard, an actress and activist whose intimate photos were re-
leased by a hacker in 2014 during the infamous “celebrity hack,” advocates for a broader understand-
ing of the phenomenon of “revenge porn” and suggests that this terminology should not be used alto-
gether. Id. After her attack in 2014, Heard took a stand against perpetrators of nonconsensual pornog-
raphy and advocated for changes in legislation. Id.; Emily Heil, Cause Celeb: Amber Heard Backs 
‘Revenge Porn’ Bill on Capitol Hill, WASH. POST (May 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
arts-entertainment/2019/05/22/cause-celeb-amber-heard-backs-revenge-porn-bill-capitol-hill/ [https://
perma.cc/95TD-J8XS] (highlighting Heard’s support for the SHEILD Act, a federal legislation de-
signed to protect nonconsensual pornography victims across the United States). Today, Heard is a 
prominent advocate for victims and urges states to reform their laws to aid all victims of nonconsen-
sual pornography. See Heard, supra note 6. 
 132 See Citron & Franks, supra note 8, at 346 (defining nonconsensual pornography as “the distri-
bution of sexually graphic images of individuals without their consent”). Professors Danielle Keats 
Citron and Mary Anne Franks, the two most prominent legal scholars within the nonconsensual por-
nography field and members of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI) board of directors, highlight 
that this definition encompasses images that are originally obtained with consent (e.g., images consen-
sually taken by or given to an intimate partner) but are later distributed to third parties without con-
sent. Id.; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-189c (2020) (requiring no intent to harm on behalf of the 
perpetrator); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5 (2020) (same). The CCRI is a nonprofit that serves vic-
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ment-focused definition, the privacy-focused definition omits the intent-to-
harm caveat.133 Thus, a privacy-focused definition of nonconsensual pornogra-
phy includes any dissemination of sexually explicit imagery without the con-
sent of the person depicted.134 
The push for a broad definition of nonconsensual pornography stems 
from new research reporting that approximately eighty percent of nonconsen-
sual pornography perpetrators do not act with the intent to harm their victim.135 
Victim’s advocacy groups, like the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI) and the 
Battling Against Demeaning and Abusive Selfie Sharing Army, advocate for a 
broad privacy-focused definition because, in most cases, efforts to prove a perpe-
trator’s intent are futile and victims feel this type of violation is ultimately more 
harmful than other privacy violations that the law does recognize.136 
Supporters of a privacy-focused definition of nonconsensual pornography 
also call for total abolishment of the use of “revenge porn” terminology.137 
                                                                                                                           
tims of cybercrimes, especially victims of nonconsensual pornography. See About Us, CYBER C.R. 
INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/welcome/ [https://perma.cc/U5SL-TLDN]. 
 133 Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5(b) (noting that it is illegal to disseminate a sexually 
explicit photo of another with knowledge or reason to know that the person depicted did not consent 
and intended the image remain private), with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2606(b)(1) (West 2020) (stat-
ing that it is illegal to disseminate a sexually explicit photo of another without the depicted person’s 
consent “with the intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the person depicted”). 
 134 See Tolentino, supra note 119. There is no singular motivator for perpetrators to post noncon-
sensual pornography online. Id. Although some post images with the intent to hurt or harass, others 
post without a motive of revenge and, thus, are challenging to prosecute under a harassment-focused 
understanding of revenge porn. Id. 
 135 EATON ET AL., supra note 12, at 19 (using a sample of 3,044 adult American Internet users); 
see Citron & Franks, supra note 12. Scholars note that empirical evidence indicates that “almost 80% 
of people who disclose private, intimate imagery without consent” do not do so with an explicit intent 
to harm others. Citron & Franks, supra note 12. Although they may not carry the intent to cause harm, 
harm still results because of their disclosure. Id. Alternative motives for disseminating sexually ex-
plicit photos of others include “to gain social status, to brag, to make money, for sexual gratification, 
or to provide ‘entertainment.’” Id. 
 136 See Citron & Franks, supra note 8, at 350, 351–56; Karshmira Gander, ‘BADASS’: The Re-
venge Porn Victims Fighting for Justice, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/
badass-revenge-porn-victim-who-turned-anger-activism-818047 [https://perma.cc/37PC-RSXU] (not-
ing that Katelyn Bowden, a “revenge porn” victim advocate, stated that “it’s extremely difficult to 
prove the intent of” disseminators and requiring such proof allows many perpetrators to avoid crimi-
nal culpability). Victims face prolonged psychological, physical, and economic harm from this type of 
cyber-attack. Citron & Franks, supra note 8, at 351. Some victims suffer from heightened anxiety and 
panic attacks. Id. Many face anonymous threats of rape or other physical attacks, verbal harassment, 
and “slut-shaming” online. Id. at 353. In addition, nonconsensual pornography attacks may cost vic-
tims their jobs and inhibit them from finding subsequent work. Id. at 352–53. State governments and 
the federal government have already recognized other private information, such as Social Security 
numbers and HIV status, that warrant protection from disclosure under the law. Id. at 356. The need 
for privacy-based nonconsensual pornography laws is rooted in the same logic surrounding other 
privacy laws—that consent is required before lawful disclosure can be made. Id.; Gander, supra. 
 137 See Heard, supra note 6. Heard argues that the term “revenge porn” is the wrong name for this 
type of abuse. Id. She urges that laws against nonconsensual pornography should focus on the victim’s 
lack of consent to the disclosure rather than the perpetrator’s motives for doing so. Id.; see Sophie 
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They urge that nonconsensual pornography should concentrate more on the 
consent, or lack thereof, of the victim rather than the motivations of the dis-
seminator.138 Consequently, proponents of a privacy-focused definition of non-
consensual pornography urge legislators to shape these laws mirroring other 
existing privacy laws.139 Their fear is that without a movement towards privacy 
laws that criminalize this type of conduct, state criminal laws will leave most 
nonconsensual pornography victims unprotected.140 
Although advocates champion a broader definition of nonconsensual por-
nography that protects victim’s privacy interests, few laws currently exist that 
reflect this broad privacy-focused definition.141 One of the most notable priva-
                                                                                                                           
Maddocks, From Non-consensual Pornography to Image-Based Sexual Abuse: Charting the Court of 
a Problem with Many Names, 33 AUSTRL. FEMINIST STUD. 345, 345 (2018) (examining the many 
different names researchers and activists have used to replace the term “revenge porn,” and describing 
the phenomenon as when an actor disseminates a sexually explicit video or image of another without 
their consent); Clare McGlynn et al., Beyond ‘Revenge Porn’: The Continuum of Image-Based Sexual 
Abuse, FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 25, 30 (2017) (arguing that the term “revenge porn” serves as a mis-
nomer for the broad range of activities that it describes). 
 138 See Citron & Franks, supra note 12; Heard, supra note 6 (echoing that the focus should be on 
victim’s consent rather than the disseminator’s intent). Centralizing criminal conduct around harass-
ment creates “categorical error” in existing law. Citron & Franks, supra note 12. Arguably, intent-to-
harm provisions create harassment laws, rather than privacy laws, making nonconsensual pornography 
law ineffective in criminalizing the actions of the majority of perpetrators. Id. 
 139 See Citron & Franks, supra note 12. Some legal scholars argue that sexual privacy is a stand-
alone privacy interest, which is a cornerstone of sexual autonomy. Id. Without privacy-based laws, 
sexual privacy violations, like nonconsensual pornography, may chill a victim’s First Amendment 
right to expression. Id. As a result, victims of nonconsensual pornography attacks will “censor” the 
material that they share with others. Id. These scholars urge that sexual privacy should be afforded the 
same protection that the law affords “other foundational privacy interests,” like health and financial 
privacy. Id.; see also Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (prohibiting disclosure of Social Securi-
ty numbers without prior consent); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 531 U.S. 67, 68 (2001) (conclud-
ing that health officials releasing positive drug test results to police was an impermissible substantial 
“invasion of privacy”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (recognizing a fundamen-
tal right to privacy within the marital relationship); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996, 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2020) (prohibiting health care providers from disclosing patients 
healthcare information and records without their consent). 
 140 See Citron & Franks, supra note 12 (arguing that the new harassment-based New York law, 
and other laws with a similar intent-to-harm provisions, will fail to provide victims with adequate 
recourse under the criminal justice system). 
 141 See Glaser, supra note 12; see also, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5 (2020); MINN. STAT. 
§ 617.261 (2020). Courts have struck down many broad privacy-based laws under the First Amend-
ment. See, e.g., supra notes 114–119 and accompanying text (illustrating how the lack of an intent-to-
harm provision in Arizona’s 2014 and 2015 versions of its nonconsensual pornography statute ren-
dered it unconstitutional); infra notes 186–196 and accompanying text (highlighting how a Texas 
court determined that the state’s nonconsensual pornography law was too vague and overly broad to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny). The Illinois statute, enacted in 2015, has a broad, privacy-focused 
definition of nonconsensual pornography. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5. In 2019, in People v. Aus-
tin, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute withstood a constitutional challenge on First 
Amendment grounds. 155 N.E.3d 439, 448, 460, 474 (Ill. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 233 (2020). 
Similarly, the Minnesota nonconsensual pornography statute, enacted in 2016, adopts a broad, priva-
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cy-based nonconsensual pornography statutes to date is the Illinois criminal 
statute.142 The Illinois legislature enacted the state’s nonconsensual pornogra-
phy statute in 2015 and modeled it after the CCRI’s “Model State Law.”143 
The Illinois statute adopted a privacy-focused definition of nonconsensual 
pornography, making it a crime to “intentionally disseminates an image of an-
other . . . who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed,” 
when the disseminator “knows or should have known that the person” depicted 
did not consent to such distribution.144 As such, the Illinois statute contains no 
intent-to-harm provision and, thus, allows virtually all victims of nonconsen-
sual pornography to pursue recourse under the state law.145 
Unfortunately, the risk associated with enacting a broad privacy-focused 
nonconsensual pornography statute is the implication it may have on free 
speech.146 Many opponents of broad, privacy-based nonconsensual pornogra-
phy laws urge that they run afoul of the First Amendment and will have an ad-
verse effect on freedom of speech by deterring individuals from engaging in 
                                                                                                                           
cy-focused definition. MINN. STAT. § 617.261. In 2020, in State v. Casillas, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that the statute was constitutionally valid. 952 N.W.2d 629, 634–35 (Minn. 2020). 
 142 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5. 
 143 See id.; Kim Bellware, Illinois Passes New ‘Revenge Porn’ Law That Includes Harsh Penal-
ties, HUFFPOST (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/illinois-revenge-porn_n_6396436 
[https://perma.cc/4J8V-TCPT] (noting that the CCRI aided in drafting the Illinois law); CCRI Model 
State Law Against NCP, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/model-state-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/72UY-U7KN] (advocating for a privacy-based statute without requiring that the 
perpetrator act with an intent to harm the victim). Mary Anne Franks, a law professor at the University 
of Miami School of Law and one of the first and most prominent legal scholars in the area of noncon-
sensual pornography and sexual privacy violations, first drafted a Model Criminal Statute in 2013. 
Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 
1256, 1269 (2017). Since then, Franks has drafted both a Model Federal Law and Model State Law. 
Id. at 1269. The Model Federal Law heavily influenced the language of the Intimate Privacy Protec-
tion Act, which was “introduced in Congress in July 2016.” Id. at 1256, 1297. The Model State Law 
serves as a reference for states enacting nonconsensual pornography laws, and it aided Franks to suc-
cessfully advise lawmakers in more than thirty states. Id. at 1256. Today, three states, Illinois, Minne-
sota, and Washington, have nonconsensual pornography laws that substantially mirror the Model State 
Law. Id. at 1293; see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5 (containing substantially similar language to the 
Model State Law); MINN. STAT. § 617.261 (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.86.010 (2020) (same).  
 144 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5(b). 
 145 See id. (omitting an intent-to-harm mens rea from the elements defining culpability); Citron & 
Franks, supra note 12 (highlighting the limiting effect of including intent-to-harm provisions in state 
nonconsensual pornography laws). Including a narrow intent-to-harm provision in a statute might 
seem harmless, but it prohibits some victims’ ability to obtain legal recourse when their perpetrators 
disclose images for other reasons, like social status, bragging rights, financial gain, pleasure, or enter-
tainment. Citron & Franks, supra note 12. 
 146 See Tolentino, supra note 119 (highlighting that criminalizing “revenge porn” may run afoul 
the First Amendment protections to free speech); see also Press Release, ACLU, supra note 117 (ar-
guing that broad nonconsensual pornography laws, without intent-to-harm provisions, are unconstitu-
tional). 
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this type of speech all together.147 Ultimately, free speech proponents fear that 
these statutes will have a chilling effect that unduly restricts otherwise protect-
ed free speech, which the Founders enacted the First Amendment to prevent.148 
II. NONCONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY LAWS:  
CONTENT-BASED OR CONTENT-NEUTRAL? 
As of 2021, there have been five notable constitutional contests to varying 
states’ nonconsensual pornography statutes.149 In each of these cases, the de-
                                                                                                                           
 147 See Tolentino, supra note 119. The ACLU points out that that laws “not limited to cases of 
revenge pornography will be ‘over[] broad’” in a constitutional context and will likely deter speech as 
a result. Id. 
 148 See Press Release, ACLU, Free Speech and Media Groups Applaud Governor’s Veto of Over-
broad “Revenge Porn” Bill (June 21, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/free-speech-and-
media-groups-applaud-governors-veto-overbroad-revenge-porn-bill [https://perma.cc/4NPE-YU3N] 
(outlining the First Amendment fears associated with passing broad nonconsensual pornography 
laws). In 2016, several groups asked Rhode Island’s then-Governor, Gina Raimondo, to reject a priva-
cy-based nonconsensual pornography bill. Id. These groups argued that the bill was too broad and 
caused a “chilling effect on free speech rights.” Id. They urged that this bill, and others like it, could 
limit the distribution of constitutionally protected images. Id.; see Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and 
the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 685 (1978). The Supreme 
Court has recognized the chilling effect since 1962. Schauer, supra, at 685; see Wieman v. Updegraff, 
344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (referring to the chilling effect in a constitu-
tional context for the first time); see also Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 345 (1967) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (summarizing the Court’s use of the chilling effect doctrine). The basis for 
the chilling effect doctrine arose out of the Court’s fear that overly broad legislation would inhibit an 
individual’s free exercise of speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Schauer, 
supra, at 685. The “chilling effect” refers to the “spillover” of a law’s application to conduct outside 
of the laws intended purpose or scope. Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1649 (2013). This “chilling effect” deters an individual from engaging in 
activity that would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment. Monica Youn, The Chilling Ef-
fect, and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1482 (2019). Under the overbreadth 
and vagueness doctrines, plaintiffs may bring facial constitutional challenges to laws that create a 
chilling effect on otherwise protected speech. Id. at 1483. The Supreme Court allowed litigants to use 
the chilling effect as a mechanism to gain standing in the courts to challenge overly broad statutes. 
Schauer, supra, at 685. In these cases, standing may be established even if the plaintiff fails to show 
that the statute chilled their own speech. Youn, supra, at 1483. Today, the chilling effect serves as a 
determinative factor that courts employ to invalidate statutes under the First Amendment. Schauer, 
supra, at 687. 
 149 See People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439, 448, 456 (Ill. 2019) (reviewing the validity of § 11-23.5 
of the Illinois Criminal Code after the defendant, Bethany Austin, brought a constitutional challenge 
under the First Amendment), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 233 (2020); State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, 
634–35 (Minn. 2020) (reviewing the constitutional validity of § 617.261 of the Minnesota Statutes 
after defendant, Michael Anthony Casillas, challenged the statute under the First Amendment); Ex 
parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346, 2018 WL 2228888, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. May 16, 2018) (reviewing the 
validity of section 21.16(b) of the Texas Penal Code after defendant, John Bartlett Jones, challenged 
the law under the First Amendment); State v. VanBuren, 214 A.3d 791, 794 (Vt. 2019) (reviewing the 
constitutional validity of section 2606 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated after defendant, Rebekah 
VanBuren, challenged the law under the First Amendment); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, supra note 114, at 2 (halting enforcement of section 13-1425 of the Arizona Revised Statutes 
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fendant, charged with violating their respective state’s nonconsensual pornog-
raphy law, challenged the statute on the basis that the law was a content-based 
regulation of speech violating the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.150 
Some of the contested state statutes, like Vermont’s, survived the constitutional 
attack because their application on speech was narrowed by an intent-to-harm 
provision.151 Courts invalidated other state statutes, however, due to their broad 
construction and risk of chilling speech.152 
The inconsistency between state court decisions has led to disagreement 
about whether nonconsensual pornography laws make content-based or con-
tent-neutral restrictions.153 Almost all nonconsensual pornography laws make it 
illegal to distribute sexually explicit photos of another without their consent, 
but some require that a perpetrator act with the intent to harm their victim.154 
Most state courts that examined the constitutionality of these laws deem these 
laws to be content-based speech restrictions.155 Some courts consider noncon-
                                                                                                                           
after the Media Coalition and the ACLU challenged the constitutional validity of the law under the 
First Amendment). 
 150 See Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 456 (explaining that the defendant challenged the state statute as a 
content-based regulation of speech subject to strict scrutiny); Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 635 (same); Ex 
parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *3 (same); VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 799 (same); see also Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 155–56 (2015) (defining a content-based regulation as a law that ap-
plies to only certain types of speech, merely because of the idea, topic, or message). 
 151 VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 812–13 (concluding that the Vermont nonconsensual pornography 
statute was narrowly tailored with respect to its intent-to-harm provision). 
 152 See, e.g., Ex parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *7 (concluding that the Texas nonconsensual 
pornography law was not narrowly tailored because it lacked an intent-to-harm provision). 
 153 Compare Franks, supra note 143, at 1318 (urging that broad nonconsensual pornography laws 
do not prohibit dissemination of material based on the material’s content), with Humbach, supra note 
30, at 217 (arguing that “revenge porn” laws “fly in the face of free speech” by discriminating based 
on a speaker’s viewpoint). Some scholars argue that nonconsensual pornography expresses a view-
point that the person depicted is “deservedly discredited by [their] sexuality,” and subsequently laws 
that prohibit nonconsensual pornography seek to criminalize such a viewpoint. Andrew Koppelman, 
Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions, 65 EMORY L.J. 661, 662–63 (2016) (assert-
ing that “revenge porn[]” laws are viewpoint content-based restrictions on speech). 
 154 See 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 5. Although 
most nonconsensual pornography laws require that the person depicted in the image did not consent, 
some nonconsensual pornography laws require the disseminator to act with an intent to harm. See id. 
Compare, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:283.2(A)(4) (2020) (requiring that a perpetrator act with the 
“intent to harass or cause emotional distress to the person in the image”), and ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, 
§ 511-A(1) (2019) (requiring that a perpetrator act with the “intent to harass, torment, or threaten the 
depicted person”), and VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.2(A) (West 2020) (requiring that the perpetrator 
act with the “intent to coerce, harass, or intimidate” the person depicted in the image), with N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-17-07.2 (West 2020) (omitting any variation of an intent-to-harm provi-
sion), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2020) (same), amended by H.B. 59, 64th Leg., Gen. 
Sess. (Utah 2021), and H.B. 147, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah), and H.B. 193, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. 
(Utah). 
 155 See, e.g., Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 635 (applying strict scrutiny after the defendant alleged that 
the Minnesota statute made a content-based restriction on speech); Ex parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, 
at *3 (same); VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 801 (same). 
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sensual pornography laws to be content-based restrictions because they “crim-
inalize[] disclosure of a photograph of a person having sex” but do not crimi-
nalize disclosure of non-sexual imagery.156 Consequently, courts routinely held 
that these statutes were unconstitutional.157 
Despite this content-based characterization by several state courts, the Il-
linois Supreme Court and several legal scholars disagree that these laws create 
content-based restrictions on speech.158 Instead, they urge sister courts to adopt 
the view that nonconsensual pornography laws make content-neutral re-
strictions on speech.159 Their rationale is that nonconsensual pornography laws 
do not favor non-sexually explicit content over sexually explicit content, but 
they merely regulate the manner in which distribution of sexually explicit con-
tent is permitted under the law.160 
Part II of this Note examines how courts have reviewed First Amendment 
challenges to nonconsensual pornography laws.161 First, Section A of this Part 
discusses how some state courts treat nonconsensual pornography laws as con-
tent-based restrictions on speech.162 Section A also explores the various court 
decisions that as a result of the statutes’ designation as content-based re-
strictions on speech, apply strict scrutiny to nonconsensual pornography 
laws.163 Section B demonstrates how some state courts treat nonconsensual 
pornography laws as content-neutral restrictions on speech, and, as a result of 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Mark Bennett, Are Statutes Criminalizing Revenge Porn Constitutional?, BENNETT & BEN-
NETT BLOG (Oct. 14, 2013), http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2013/10/are-statutes-criminalizing-
revenge-porn-constitutional/#obscenity [https://perma.cc/R8QX-5CWK]; see Christian Nisttáhuz, 
Comment, Fifty States of Gray: A Comparative Analysis of “Revenge Porn” Legislation Throughout 
the United States and Texas’s Relationship Privacy Act, 50 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 333, 351–52 (2018) 
(suggesting that courts should find that “revenge porn” laws impose content-based restrictions on 
speech). 
 157 See, e.g., Ex parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *8 (concluding Texas’s nonconsensual por-
nography statute was invalid under the U.S. Constitution). 
 158 See Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 457–58 (holding that the privacy-based statute made a content-
neutral restriction on speech because it did not prohibit, but merely regulated, the disclosure of sexual-
ly explicit images); Franks, supra note 143, at 1318 (arguing that privacy-based laws make content-
neutral restrictions on speech because they regulate the manner of dissemination rather than the 
speaker’s message). 
 159 See Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 457–58 (concluding that the Illinois privacy-based statute was a con-
tent-neutral restriction that merely regulated the manner of speech rather than its content); Franks, supra 
note 143, at 1318; Press Release, Off. of Congresswoman Jackie Speier, Rep Speier and Sens Harris, 
Burr, and Klobuchar Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Address Online Exploitation of Private Images (Nov. 
28, 2017), https://speier.house.gov/2017/11/rep-speir-and-sens-harris-burr-and-klobuchar-introduce-
bipartisan-bill [https://perma.cc/LB4U-XH8N] (detailing how the proposed federal ENOUGH Act would 
promulgate a content-neutral law regulating only the actors who disseminate sexually explicit images 
without the victim’s consent). The ENOUGH Act is a bi-partisan co-sponsored bill in the House of Rep-
resentatives. Press Release, Off. of Congresswoman Jackie Speier, supra. 
 160 See Franks, supra note 143, at 1318. 
 161 See infra notes 165–243 and accompanying text. 
 162 See infra notes 165–174 and accompanying text. 
 163 See infra notes 175–219 and accompanying text. 
1392 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1365 
their designation as content-neutral restrictions, it explores these courts’ appli-
cation of intermediate scrutiny to such laws.164 
A. Nonconsensual Pornography Laws Treated  
as Content-Based Restrictions on Speech 
A law is a content-based restriction on speech if the law applies to speech 
merely because of the topic, idea, or message expressed.165 Courts have tradi-
tionally considered nonconsensual pornography laws as content-based re-
strictions because these statutes arguably draw distinctions upon expression—
images—based on their sexually explicit content.166 Under the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, content-based restrictions are pre-
sumed unconstitutional due to the threat they pose to individuals’ First 
Amendment rights.167 Content-based restrictions, and the laws that regulate 
speech based on its content, are constitutionally valid only if the court finds 
that they satisfy strict scrutiny.168 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet heard a case regarding the con-
stitutional validity of nonconsensual pornography laws, state level challenges 
to nonconsensual pornography laws demonstrate the effect of strict scrutiny 
review on these laws.169 In 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively, three criminal 
defendants challenged the constitutional validity of Texas’s, Vermont’s, and 
Minnesota’s nonconsensual pornography laws.170 The Texas, Vermont, and 
Minnesota courts applied strict scrutiny to determine the respective statute’s 
validity.171 The cases had differing outcomes, highlighting the uncertainty of ap-
                                                                                                                           
 164 See infra notes 220–243 and accompanying text. 
 165 See supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text (defining content-based restrictions on speech). 
 166 See, e.g., State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2020) (applying strict scrutiny with-
out concluding whether the Minnesota statute was content-based or content-neutral); Ex parte Jones, 
No. 12-17-00346, 2018 WL 2228888, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. May 16, 2018) (concluding that the Texas 
Penal Code provision prohibiting the dissemination of nonconsensual pornography was a content-
based restriction on speech). 
 167 See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 168 See supra notes 53–62 and accompanying text (outlining the strict scrutiny inquiry). 
 169 See Austin v. Illinois, 141 S. Ct. 233, 233 (2020) (denying the petition for writ of certiorari). 
See generally Ex parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *5 (utilizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s strict 
scrutiny inquiry to determine that a statute was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est); State v. VanBuren, 214 A.3d 791, 807–14 (Vt. 2019) (employing the Supreme Court’s distinction 
between content-neutral and content-based restrictions on speech to determine which level of scrutiny 
to apply to Vermont’s nonconsensual pornography law). 
 170 See Ex parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *1, *5 (reviewing the validity of the Texas noncon-
sensual pornography statute after the defendant challenged the statute’s regulation of speech); VanBu-
ren, 214 A.3d at 796, 813 (reviewing the validity of the Vermont nonconsensual pornography statute 
after the defendant challenged the statute under the First Amendment). 
 171 See Ex parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *5 (invalidating the Texas nonconsensual pornog-
raphy law); VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 807, 813 (upholding the Vermont nonconsensual pornography 
law). 
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plying strict scrutiny analysis when addressing nonconsensual pornography 
laws.172 Subsection 1 describes the impact of strict scrutiny upon harassment-
based nonconsensual pornography statutes.173 Subsection 2 explains the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny upon privacy-based nonconsensual pornography statutes.174 
1. The Effect of Applying Strict Scrutiny to Harassment-Based 
Nonconsensual Pornography Statutes 
In 2019, in State v. VanBuren, the Vermont Supreme Court considered 
whether Vermont’s harassment-based nonconsensual pornography law was 
valid under the First Amendment.175 The defendant, Rebekah VanBuren, 
brought a constitutional challenge to the Vermont nonconsensual pornography 
statute, section 2606 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated, as a defense to crimi-
nal charges brought against her for posting naked photos of her ex-boyfriend’s 
then-new girlfriend on Facebook.176 In an effort to dismiss the charges, the de-
fendant brought a facial challenge arguing that the statute was invalid because it 
was a content-based restriction on speech and was not properly narrowly tailored 
to Vermont’s compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny analysis.177 
On appeal, however, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that section 
2606 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated survived strict scrutiny because it is a 
narrowly defined statute that did not prohibit speech beyond the purview of the 
state’s compelling interest.178 The court noted that the government’s interest, 
preventing any intrusions on an individual’s privacy, was substantial, particu-
larly in cases when the invasion of privacy involved nonconsensual pornogra-
                                                                                                                           
 172 See State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2020) (concluding that Minnesota’s priva-
cy-based nonconsensual pornography statute, lacking an intent-to-harm provision, survived strict 
scrutiny); Ex parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *7 (explaining that a statute that lacks an intent-to-
harm provision will be invalidated under strict scrutiny analysis); VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 813–14 
(stating that a statute containing an intent-to-harm provision will survive strict scrutiny analysis). 
 173 See infra notes 175–185 and accompanying text. 
 174 See infra notes 186–219 and accompanying text. 
 175 See 214 A.3d at 814 (considering whether the Vermont law, which included an intent-to-harm 
provision, was constitutionally valid); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2606 (West 2018). 
 176 See VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 796–98. In 2015, the defendant, Rebekah VanBuren, was arrested 
for violating section 2606 when she posted nude photos on Facebook that depicted her ex-boyfriend’s 
new girlfriend. Id. at 797. In 2016, in State v. VanBuren, the Vermont Superior Court for the Benning-
ton Criminal Division ultimately dismissed the defendant’s charges because it found that the Vermont 
statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 798. The State of Vermont challenged the trial court’s dismissal of 
the defendant’s charges, which ultimately brought the case to the Vermont Supreme Court in 2019. Id. 
 177 See id. at 797. The trial court concluded that the state failed to show that there was no less 
restrictive alternative available for the law, and, as a result, it decided that the statute did not survive 
strict scrutiny analysis under the U.S. Constitution. Id. 
 178 Id. at 813. In 2019, in State v. VanBuren, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the ex-
press limitations on the statute’s reach meant that it was narrowly tailored to the state’s interest. Id. 
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phy.179 In upholding the protections of the statute, the court highlighted several 
restrictions unique to the Vermont statute that narrowly tailored it to that inter-
est.180 Specifically, the court explained that the law was not unduly overbroad 
because it made disclosure criminal only if a specific intent-to-harm the im-
age’s subject accompanied it.181 The court reasoned that the intent-to-harm 
provisions in the statute abated fears of the statute penalizing otherwise pro-
tected speech, or chilling protected speech altogether.182 
The Vermont Supreme Court’s ruling was a significant victory because it 
stands as one of the few statutes addressing nonconsensual pornography to 
withstand strict scrutiny under the U.S. Constitution.183 The intent-to-harm 
provision was critical to the statute’s survival because it adequately served to 
narrowly tailor the scope of the law.184 Although the inclusion of such a provi-
sion restricts the amount of free speech implicated under the statute, it also 
restricts the number of victims that the statute can protect.185 
2. The Effect of Applying Strict Scrutiny to Privacy-Based Nonconsensual 
Pornography Statutes 
In 2018, in Ex Parte Jones, the Twelfth Court of Appeals of Texas ana-
lyzed the constitutional validity of Texas’s privacy-based nonconsensual por-
                                                                                                                           
 179 See id. at 810–11. The court acknowledged that the harm to victims of this crime was substan-
tial because these images could be disseminated to friends, family, employers, and anyone else who 
came across them. Id. at 810. The court noted that it would be hard to imagine something more private 
than images of an individual’s genitals or of an individual engaging in a sexual act. Id. 
 180 Id. at 812–13. The court noted that the Vermont statute “precisely defined, with little gray 
area,” what types of images that the law regulated. Id. at 812. The law also contained a specific provi-
sion requiring the intent to harm, which the court noted further restricted the statute’s applicability. Id. 
 181 Id. at 812. 
 182 See id. at 814. The court also noted that because the statute was narrowly tailored, it did not 
run the risk of chilling more speech than necessary speech to accomplish its purpose. Id. 
 183 See id. (concluding that the Vermont statute was constitutional). Compare Ex parte Jones, No. 
12-17-00346, 2018 WL 2228888, at *7 (Tex. Ct. App. May 16, 2018) (holding that section 21.16(b)(2) 
of the Texas Penal Code was invalid and not properly tailored because it included no express clause, 
like an intent-to-harm provision, to limit the conduct implicated in the law), with VanBuren, 214 A.3d 
at 814 (determining that section 2606 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated was narrowly tailored be-
cause it limited the conduct implicated under the statute to conduct that was intended to harm the 
person depicted in the image). 
 184 See VanBuren, 214 A.3d at 813 (holding that section 2606 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated 
was constitutionally valid because of the express limitations built into the statute’s language requiring 
a specific intent to harm the victim). 
 185 See Glaser, supra note 12. Most perpetrators do not intend to harm or hurt their “revenge 
porn” victims. EATON ET AL., supra note 12, at 19; Glaser, supra note 12. As such, statutes limiting 
unlawful conduct with an intent-to-harm provision do not adequately protect most victims of this type 
of invasion of privacy. See Glaser, supra note 12. 
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nography statute.186 The court reviewed the conviction of the defendant, John 
Bartlett Jones, under section 21.16(b) of the Texas Penal Code, for the unlaw-
ful disclosure of intimate visual material.187 The defendant challenged his con-
viction by contesting the validity of section 21.16(b), alleging that the statute 
was facially overbroad and, therefore, violated the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.188 The Texas statute criminalized disseminating intimate 
visual material of another without consent and where (1) the depicted person is 
identifiable in the image and created the image with the expectation that it 
would remain private and (2) the dissemination of such material causes harm 
to the person depicted.189 Because the court viewed the statute as regulating 
speech based on its sexual content, deeming it a content-based restriction, the 
Court of Appeals of Texas applied strict scrutiny.190 
Under the strict scrutiny analysis, the Jones court recognized that Texas 
had a compelling government interest in protecting individuals from substan-
tial invasions of their privacy and that the statute’s purpose was to protect dis-
closure of images that were intended to remain private.191 The court, however, 
ultimately concluded that the statute’s language was not properly constrained 
in meeting that interest in a manner that did not overly burden free speech.192 
The court relied on a hypothetical to justify its position, which articulated a 
scenario wherein the Texas criminal statute, as it stood, could prohibit the con-
duct of many purportedly innocent actors.193 
                                                                                                                           
 186 2018 WL 2228888, at *1; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16(b)(2) (West Supp. 2017) 
(amended 2019) (requiring no intent-to-harm on behalf of the perpetrator), invalidated by Ex parte 
Jones, 2018 WL 2228888. 
 187 Ex parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *1; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16(b)(2). In 2017, 
prosecutors charged defendant, John Bartlett Jones, with unlawful disclosure of an intimate visual 
material under the Texas Penal Code. 2018 WL 2228888, at *1. The defendant, who the court held as 
a pre-train detainee, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the 
provision of the Texas Penal Code on First Amendment grounds. Id. 
 188 Ex parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *1. 
 189 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16(b)(2) (further defining the statute’s terminology). 
 190 See Ex parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *3–4. In 2018, in Ex parte Jones, the Twelfth Court 
of Appeals of Texas concluded that images (photographs and visual recordings) are inherently expres-
sive and therefore fall under First Amendment protection. Id. at *3. The court also held that the regu-
lation itself was a content-based regulation because it penalized a narrow type of expression that “de-
pict[s] another person with the person’s intimate parts exposed or engaged in sexual conduct.” Id. at 
*4. 
 191 See id. at *5; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011). In 2011, in Snyder v. 
Phelps, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated that privacy may constitute a government interest when 
the privacy interest is substantial and the invasion occurs in an “intolerable manner.” 562 U.S. at 459 
(quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
 192 See Ex parte Jones, 2018 WL 2228888, at *7. The Texas court concluded that the Texas legis-
lature did not use the “least restrictive means” of achieving its interest in protecting citizens from this 
sort of invasion of privacy. Id. Therefore, court held the statute was invalid. Id. at *8. 
 193 See id. at *5–6. The court presented a hypothetical: 
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In rendering its decision, the Texas court noted that the legislature could 
narrow the statute by adding additional requirements—such as an intent-to-
harm provision—to find criminally culpability.194 Under strict scrutiny, how-
ever, section 21.16(b) of the Texas Penal Code, as it stood, was invalid because 
it failed to use the least restrictive means to reach the legitimate government 
interest in preventing substantial invasions of privacy.195 The Twelfth Court of 
Appeal of Texas’s decision in Ex parte Jones demonstrates the hurdles that 
state legislatures face when enacting privacy-based nonconsensual pornogra-
phy laws that lack an intent-to-harm provision.196 
This strict scrutiny hurdle seemed insurmountable for privacy-based non-
consensual pornography laws until the 2020 Minnesota Supreme Court deci-
sion in State v. Casillas.197 There, the court considered the constitutionality of 
Minnesota’s nonconsensual pornography law, section 617.261 of the Minneso-
ta Statutes.198 The Minnesota nonconsensual pornography statute is one of the 
                                                                                                                           
Adam and Barbara are in a committed relationship. One evening, in their home, during 
a moment of passion, Adam asks Barbara if he can take a nude photograph of her. Bar-
bara consents, but before Adam takes the picture, she tells him that he must not show 
the photograph to anyone else. Adam promises that he will never show the picture to 
another living soul, and takes a photograph of Barbara in front of a plain, white back-
ground with her breasts exposed. 
 A few months pass, and Adam and Barbara break up after Adam discovers that Bar-
bara has had an affair. A few weeks later, Adam rediscovers the topless photo he took 
of Barbara. Feeling angry and betrayed, Adam emails the photo without comment to 
several of his friends, including Charlie. Charlie never had met Barbara and, therefore, 
does not recognize her. But he likes the photograph and forwards the email without 
comment to some of his friends, one of whom, unbeknownst to Charlie, is Barbara’s 
coworker, Donna. Donna recognizes Barbara and shows the picture to Barbara’s super-
visor, who terminates Barbara’s employment. 
 Meanwhile, Adam also emails the picture to Ed. This time, however, Adam writes 
in the body of the email, “She thought I never would show anyone.” Ed reads the email 
and forwards it with the attachment to several friends. 
Id. The court determined that under this hypothetical, the Texas law criminalized the actions of both 
Charlie and Donna, two innocent actors with First Amendment rights. Id. at *6. The court further 
reasoned that Charlie “ha[d] a First Amendment right to share a photograph” and lacked a notion of 
whether Barbara intended the photo to remain private. Id. 
 194 See id. at *7. The court noted that the legislature could narrow the criminal liability imposed 
by the statute by “requiring that the disclosing person have knowledge of the circumstances giving 
rise to the victim’s privacy expectation.” Id. Additionally, the court explained that the addition of an 
intent-to-harm provision may sort out the ambiguities of this law. See id. 
 195 Id. at *7–8 (concluding that section 21.16(b) of the Texas Penal Code was invalid). 
 196 See id. (highlighting that a strict scrutiny inquiry invalidated a nonconsensual pornography 
law that sought to protect a privacy interest and lacked an intent-to-harm provision). 
 197 Compare id. at *7 (illustrating that once a privacy-based law is adjudged a content-based re-
striction on speech, the presumption of invalidity is nearly impossible to overcome), with State v. 
Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2020) (deciding for the first time that a privacy-based noncon-
sensual pornography law, with no intent-to-harm clause, survived strict scrutiny). 
 198 Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 640–44 (reviewing the Minnesota state statute under strict scrutiny). 
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very few comprehensive, privacy-based nonconsensual pornography laws en-
acted by state legislatures to date.199 Section 617.261 makes it a crime to “in-
tentionally disseminate” a sexually explicit image200 of another when (1) the 
person in the image is identifiable, (2) the disseminator knows or reasonably 
should know that the person depicted in the image does not consent to the dis-
semination or had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (3) the image was 
created under circumstances where the disseminator knew or should have 
known the person depicted had a reasonable expectation of privacy.201 Unique 
to the Minnesota statute, is the lack of an intent-to-harm provision.202 
The defendant, Michael Antony Casillas, brought a constitutional chal-
lenge to Minnesota’s nonconsensual pornography statute, as a defense to felo-
ny charges brought against him.203 The defendant moved to dismiss the felony 
charges at the district court level, but the Dakota County District Court of 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See MINN. STAT. § 617.261 (2018) (including no intent-to-harm provision and, therefore, cre-
ating a privacy-based nonconsensual pornography law). 
 200 See id. § 617.261(1). Under the Minnesota statute, a sexually explicit image includes “an im-
age of another who is depicted in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed.” Id. The statute 
further defines the terms “sexual act” and “intimate parts.” Id. § 617.271(7)(a). 
 201 Id. Section 617.271 of the Minnesota Statutes, the state’s nonconsensual pornography statute, 
states: 
Subdivision 1. Crime. It is a crime to intentionally disseminate an image of another 
person who is depicted in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed, in whole or 
in part, when: 
 (1) the person is identifiable: 
(i) from the image itself, by the person depicted in the image or by another per-
son; or 
(ii) from personal information displayed in connection with the image; 
 (2) the actor knows or reasonably should know that the person depicted in the image 
does not consent to the dissemination; and 
 (3) the image was obtained or created under circumstances in which the actor knew 
or reasonably should have known the person depicted had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy . . . .  
Id. Perpetrators whose actions fit the elements of section 617.261(1) are guilty of a gross misdemean-
or. Id. § 617.261(2)(a). Section 617.261(2)(b) of the statute, however, imposes felony charges on any 
perpetrator if any of the seven aggravating factors is present. See id. § 617.261(2)(b). 
 202 See id. § 617.271 (containing no variation of an intent-to-harm provision, making the statute a 
privacy-based nonconsensual pornography law). 
 203 Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 635. In 2016, the defendant, Michael Anthony Casillas, and his then-
girlfriend (called “A.M.” for purposes of anonymity) were in a three-month relationship. Id. at 634. 
During their relationship, the defendant’s girlfriend gave him access to her Dish Network Cloud ac-
count. Id. After their relationship ended, the defendant used her password information to access her 
accounts, which enabled him to view a video and images of his ex-girlfriend engaged in “sexual rela-
tions” with another man. Id. The defendant originally only threatened to send the video and images of 
his ex-girlfriend to others. Id. at 634–35. Ultimately, he sent the video to forty-four individuals, and he 
posted the video online. Id. at 635. Prosecutors charged the defendant with a felony under § 617.261 
of the Minnesota Statutes. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 617.261. 
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Minnesota denied his motion to dismiss and convicted the defendant.204 In an 
effort to overturn his felony conviction, he appealed.205 The Minnesota Court 
of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction and deemed Minnesota’s non-
consensual pornography statute “unconstitutionally overbroad” and, therefore, 
invalid.206 Following the court’s holding, the state petitioned to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court for further review on the constitutional validity of the Minne-
sota statute.207 
Upon review of the appellate court’s decision, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court concluded that to survive the defendant’s constitutional challenge, sec-
tion 617.261 of the Minnesota Statutes must pass strict scrutiny review.208 
Unique to the court’s analysis was the appellate judge’s decision to forego 
characterizing the statute’s content distinction to determine the applicable level 
of scrutiny for review.209 Instead, the court chose to apply the most-exacting 
level of scrutiny, regardless of the statute’s content distinction.210 
Despite the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision to undergo strict scruti-
ny analysis, the court concluded that Minnesota’s privacy-based statute was 
constitutionally valid.211 The decision made the Minnesota Supreme Court the 
first ever state court to conclude that a privacy-based nonconsensual pornogra-
                                                                                                                           
 204 Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 635 (denying the motion to dismiss the defendant’s felony charges 
under section 617.261 of the Minnesota Statutes). In State v. Casillas, the Dakota County District 
Court of Minnesota initially denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, wherein he asserted his first 
constitutional challenge to the state’s statute. Id. In this motion to dismiss, the defendant asserted that 
the Minnesota statute made a constitutionally impermissible and overbroad restriction on speech. Id. 
(asserting that the law was “overbroad, an impermissible content-based restriction, and void for 
vagueness”). In denying the motion, the district court found that the statute regulated “obscene 
speech,” which is not protected by the First Amendment. Id. The district court also concluded that the 
“degree of overbreadth was insubstantial.” Id. 
 205 See generally State v. Casillas, 938 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (reviewing the defend-
ant’s appeal and the constitutional validity of section 617.261 of the Minnesota Statutes), rev’d, 952 
N.W.2d 629 (Minn. 2020). 
 206 Id. at 74, 78 (holding that the statute criminalizing nonconsensual pornography “facially vio-
lated [the] First Amendment overbreadth doctrine” and was “not reasonably subject to narrowing 
construction” and was thus invalid). 
 207 Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 635. 
 208 Id. at 641. 
 209 Id. (asserting that the court “need not determine whether [the statute] is a content-based or 
content-neutral” restriction on speech). In 2020, in State v. Casillas, the Minnesota Supreme Court did 
not further rationalize the decision to not characterize the statute’s content distinction. Id. The court 
solely concluded that because the state met its burden of proof under strict scrutiny, determining the 
content distinction was not necessary. Id. At the end of the strict scrutiny analysis, however, the court 
acknowledged that the statute was a content-based restriction on speech. Id. at 644. The court con-
cluded that even if it were to “assume” that the statute made a content-based restriction on speech, it 
survived strict scrutiny. Id. 
 210 Id. at 641–44 (applying the strict scrutiny analysis to review the constitutional validity of the 
Minnesota statute). 
 211 Id. at 644 (holding that section 617.261 of the Minnesota Statutes does not violate the First 
Amendment because it made a valid restriction on speech that was narrowly tailored to serve the 
state’s compelling interest). 
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phy statute, without an intent-to-harm clause, withstood strict scrutiny re-
view.212 
To reach this unprecedented decision, the court walked step-by-step 
through the strict scrutiny inquiry.213 First, the Minnesota Supreme Court eval-
uated the strength of the state’s interest in prohibiting the dissemination of 
nonconsensual pornography.214 The court concluded that the state had demon-
strated its compelling interest in prohibiting the “permanent and severe harms” 
that result from the nonconsensual sharing of private sexually images.215 Sec-
ond, the court held that the legislature had adequately narrowly tailored section 
617.261 of the Minnesota Statutes to address the state’s interest because the 
“statute proscribe[d] only private speech that (1) was intentionally disseminat-
ed without consent,216 (2) fell within numerous statutory definitions,217 and (3) 
was outside of the seven broad exemptions” that the statute promulgates.218 To 
                                                                                                                           
 212 Compare id. (concluding that Minnesota’s privacy-based statute satisfied strict scrutiny and 
was a valid restriction on speech under the U.S. Constitution), with Ex parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346, 
2018 WL 2228888, at *7 (Tex. Ct. App. May 16, 2018) (concluding that Texas’s privacy-based stat-
ute did not satisfy strict scrutiny and was, therefore, invalid under the U.S. Constitution). 
 213 See Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 641–44 (determining whether the statute was adequately narrow-
ly tailored to meet a compelling and substantial state interest). The court, however, did not explicitly 
rationalize its determination that the statute was “the least restrictive means” to meet the state’s com-
pelling interest. See id. at 643 (quoting United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 
(2003) (requiring that the legislation use the “least restrictive means” to promote the state’s compel-
ling interest and be constitutionally valid under strict scrutiny)). 
 214 Id. at 641–42. 
 215 Id. at 641–42, 644. In analyzing the state’s interest, the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically 
emphasized the pervasive harms that victims of nonconsensual pornography face. Id. at 641–42. The 
court honed in on the emotional, health, and reputational harms that result from the exposure of their 
private sexual images to their friends, family, co-workers, and even strangers on the Internet. Id. The 
court emphasized that the significant harms that victims of nonconsensual pornography face are a 
“direct threat to [the] [state’s] citizens’ health and safety.” Id. at 642. The court highlighted that it is a 
long-recognized principle that the state has a compelling interest in the well-being of its citizens. See 
id. (highlighting the holdings from various other Minnesota Supreme Court decisions that found the 
state had an interest in the well-being of its citizens). 
 216 Id. at 643–44. The court reasoned that the language of the Minnesota statute served to narrow 
its scope. Id. at 643. The court specifically honed in on two provisions of the statute. Id. The first 
provision required the perpetrator to “intentionally” disseminate the image. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. 
§ 617.261(1) (2018)). The court highlighted that this “mens rea requirement” intended for only 
“knowing[] and voluntary[]” disclosures to be prohibited but not “negligent, accidental, or even reck-
less distributions.” Id. Second, the court emphasized that a conviction under § 617.261 of the Minne-
sota Statutes required the perpetrator to act without the consent of the person in the image. Id. The 
court noted that this provision abated fears that the statute would prohibit “commercial advertise-
ments, certain adult films, artistic works, and other creative expression.” Id. at 643–44. 
 217 Id. at 643. The court reasoned that § 617.261 of the Minnesota Statutes also narrowed its ap-
plication to speech by promulgating various definitions to limit the types of images proscribed by the 
statute. Id. The court explained that the statute narrowed the definition of image by including modifi-
ers like “sexual act” and “intimate parts,” which narrowed the types of images that law expressly 
prohibits. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 617.261(1)). 
 218 Id. at 644. 
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finalize this unique decision, the court emphasized that this is one of the rare 
cases where a content-based restriction survives strict scrutiny.219 
B. Nonconsensual Pornography Laws Treated as  
Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech 
In contrast to content-based restrictions, content-neutral restrictions on 
speech regulate speech without reference to the idea, message, or viewpoint 
expressed.220 Because content-neutral laws do not pose the same threats of 
censoring or chilling constitutionally protected speech, they are not considered 
presumptively invalid under the First Amendment.221 For the court to conclude 
that a content-neutral law is constitutionally valid, it must satisfy the less-
exacting standard of intermediate scrutiny.222 
To date, only one state court has determined that nonconsensual pornog-
raphy laws are a content-neutral restriction on speech requiring review under 
intermediate scrutiny.223 In 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court applied this less-
exacting standard of review to a nonconsensual pornography statute to analyze 
the Illinois nonconsensual pornography law in People v. Austin.224 
The constitutional challenge to section 11-23.5(b) of the Illinois Criminal 
Code came in response to charges brought against the defendant, Bethany Aus-
tin, who shared sexually explicit images of another woman by mail.225 In re-
sponse to her indictment, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing 
that the Illinois statute was facially unconstitutional and was not narrowly tai-
                                                                                                                           
 219 Id. (emphasizing that the statute would survive strict scrutiny even if the court were to assume 
it made a content-based restriction on speech). The court also rejected the argument that the Minneso-
ta statute made a “viewpoint” restriction on speech. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)). The court rationalized that the legislature’s motive in enacting 
the statute was more than a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always ac-
company an unpopular viewpoint.” Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509). 
 220 See supra notes 63–71 and accompanying text. 
 221 See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 222 See supra notes 75–82 and accompanying text. 
 223 People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439, 456–58 (Ill. 2019) (concluding that the Illinois nonconsen-
sual pornography statute made “a content-neutral, time, place, and manner restriction” on speech), 
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 233 (2020). 
 224 Id. at 456 (concluding that the intermediate scrutiny standard applied). 
 225 Id. at 448–49; see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-23.5 (West 2016). In People v. Austin, the 
defendant, Bethany Austin, was engaged to her former fiancé, Matthew, when she discovered that he 
was seeing another woman in secret. 155 N.E.3d at 449. After ending their relationship, the defendant 
retained the passwords to her ex-fiancé’s iCloud account and accessed the messages sent between him 
and the other woman, which included sexually explicit photos of the other woman. Id. The defendant 
decided to write a detailed letter to her ex-fiancé’s cousin about the affair and included the sexually 
explicit photos. Id. These events ultimately led to the defendant’s arrest and, subsequently, charges 
brought against her under the Illinois nonconsensual pornography statute. Id. 
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lored to a compelling state interest.226 The Illinois statute is one of the most 
comprehensive, privacy-based nonconsensual pornography laws, outlawing the 
nonconsensual dissemination of sexual images when (1) an actor “intentionally 
disseminates” photos where the victim is identifiable, (2) where the image is 
obtained under circumstances wherein a “reasonable person would know or 
understand that the image was meant to remain private,” and (3) the dissemina-
tor “knows or should have known” the victim did “not consent[] to the dissem-
ination.”227 Notably, the statute does not include an intent-to-harm provision.228 
The Illinois Supreme Court’s analysis differs from other courts due to the 
level of scrutiny the court chose to apply.229 Because the court held that law 
was not a content-based regulation, the court determined the law need only 
survive an intermediate level of scrutiny.230 
The Illinois court set forth two reasons justifying its decision to lower the 
level of scrutiny applied.231 First, the court explained that the nonconsensual 
pornography statute was “a content-neutral time, place, and manner re-
striction.”232 The court noted that another court might initially, but mistakenly, 
conclude that the statute was a content-based restriction because it targeted a 
                                                                                                                           
 226 Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 449. The defendant argued that the statute was unconstitutional because 
it outlaws protected speech in violation of both the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions. Id. 
 227 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-23.5(b) (emphasis added); Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 460–61 
(explaining how the Illinois statute’s elements defining criminal culpability made the statute narrowly 
tailored to not burden more speech than necessary). 
 228 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-23.5 (including no variation of an intent-to-harm provi-
sion). 
 229 Compare Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 456 (applying intermediate scrutiny to evaluate whether the 
statute was a permissible regulation of speech under the First Amendment), with State v. VanBuren, 
214 A.3d 791, 814 (Vt. 2019) (applying strict scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the statute 
under the First Amendment). In 2019, in People v. Austin, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that it is 
the court’s objective to independently assess what type of scrutiny should be applied, even when both 
the state and defendant concede to the application of strict scrutiny. 155 N.E.3d at 456. Although even 
the state agreed that strict scrutiny should apply here, the Illinois court’s own inquiry revealed apply-
ing strict scrutiny was not proper in this case. Id. 
 230 Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 457. The court concluded the statute was a content-neutral regulation 
because it regulated the manner that sexually explicit photographs are disseminated rather than the 
mere fact that the images were sexually explicit. Id. at 457–58. 
 231 See id. at 456, 457–58 (concluding that § 11-23.5 of the Illinois Criminal Code, which applied 
to purely private speech, only regulated the manner of which that speech is disseminated). 
 232 Id. at 457–58. First, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that the Illinois statute did not regu-
late speech based on the content of the image but rather based on the circumstances surrounding the 
images dissemination. Id. at 457. More specifically, the court noted that the statute regulated circum-
stances because it only made the conduct illegal when there is a clear lack of consent or a reason to 
believe there is lack of consent. Id. at 457–58. The court further concluded that the Illinois statute 
regulated the dissemination of private information. Id. at 458. Therefore, the court explained this stat-
ute operated like other privacy statutes that prohibit unauthorized disclosures of, for example, medical 
records, Social Security numbers, and other types of personal information. Id. As such, the court held 
that purely private matters are not afforded the same First Amendment protections. Id. 
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specific category of speech.233 The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned, however, 
that this law was content-neutral because it is rooted in whether the dissemina-
tor obtained the image under circumstances wherein “a reasonable person 
would know that the image was to remain private . . . or should have known 
that the [victim] in the image [did] not consent[] to the dissemination.”234 
Thus, the court concluded that the manner of the acquisition and dissemination 
of the photo is the critical component of the illegal conduct, rather than the 
image’s content, rendering it a proper “time, place, or manner” restriction and 
subject to a lesser level of scrutiny.235 
Second, the Illinois Supreme Court justified its use of intermediate scruti-
ny because the statute regulated a “purely private matter.”236 The court noted 
that First Amendment protections are less rigorous where matters of purely 
private significance are at issue.237 The court explained that although speech 
pertaining to private matters are not entirely exempt from First Amendment 
protection, the protection is less stringent.238 
As a result, the Illinois court applied intermediate scrutiny and ultimately 
held that the statute was constitutionally valid.239 In applying this less-exacting 
standard of review, the court determined that the state articulated a compelling 
interest in protecting individual citizens’ privacy rights.240 The court further 
concluded that the scope of the statute was reasonable and proportionate to the 
                                                                                                                           
 233 Id. at 457 (noting that “on its face” the Illinois statute targets “the dissemination of a specific 
category of speech,” but ultimately concluding that the statute specifically targets whether or not con-
sent was attached to the dissemination of the image, not the image’s content). 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 See id. at 458 (concluding that the Illinois statute was subject to an intermediate level of scru-
tiny because it regulates a “purely private matter”). 
 237 See id. (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011)) (articulating the holding from 
Snyder v. Phelps, concluding that restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the 
same concerns about limiting speech under the Constitution because it poses no threat to the free and 
“robust” debate of public issues); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 
U.S. 749, 758 (1985) (plurality opinion) (highlighting that restrictions on speech concerning purely 
private matters are “of less First Amendment concern” than restrictions on speech concerning public 
matters); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (noting that private speech still falls within the 
protection of the First Amendment, but noting it does not have the same importance as matters of 
public concern). 
 238 Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 458 (citing Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452) (stating that in “matters of purely 
private significance,” First Amendment protection is less rigorous). 
 239 See id. at 466 (concluding that because the statute made a content-neutral restriction, interme-
diate scrutiny applied). The Illinois court concluded “that the substantial government interest of pro-
tecting Illinois residents from the nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images would be 
achieved less effectively absent” the statute making it unlawful. Id. at 462. The court rationalized that 
the statute was narrowly tailored under intermediate scrutiny “so long as the law promotes a substan-
tial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the law.” Id. 
 240 See id. at 460–61. The court noted that history suggests that the government can protect an 
individual’s privacy rights. Id. at 460. 
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state’s interest.241 The court held that the statute was valid because the state’s 
interest in protecting victims of this type of harm would not be effectively 
achieved without the statute.242 
 Although no other court has applied intermediate scrutiny to a harass-
ment-based or privacy-based nonconsensual pornography law, the analysis of 
the Illinois Supreme Court enables sister courts, who engage in constitutional 
review of nonconsensual pornography laws, to uphold more statutes.243 
III. COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER PRIVACY-BASED NONCONSENSUAL 
PORNOGRAPHY LAWS CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH 
In 2013, only three states had passed laws addressing nonconsensual por-
nography.244 Today, legislation criminalizing the nonconsensual dissemination 
of sexually explicit photos of another is on the books in forty-eight states, 
Washington, D.C., and one U.S. territory.245 Although the legal landscape has 
substantially transformed since 2013, the majority of existing laws today do 
not adequately provide protection to victims for modern nonconsensual por-
nography attacks.246 
                                                                                                                           
 241 See id. at 465. The court underwent an analysis of the many provisions included in the law that 
made it narrowly tailored. Id. The court also enumerated the many exceptions listed in the statute that 
allow a perpetrator to escape charges under the statute, allowing for this speech to be lawful if it en-
hances a public good, like “criminal investigations” or service of a “lawful public purpose.” Id. at 
465–66 (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-23.5(c) (West 2016)). 
 242 Id. at 462. 
 243 Compare id. at 459, 466 (applying intermediate scrutiny to the Illinois nonconsensual pornog-
raphy laws, and holding that the law was constitutionally permissible), with Ex parte Jones, No. 12-
17-00346, 2018 WL 2228888, at *5, *7 (Tex. Ct. App. May 16, 2018) (applying strict scrutiny to 
Texas’s nonconsensual pornography law, and concluding the statute was invalid under the First 
Amendment). 
 244 Franks, supra note 143, at 1255. Before 2003, no law, state or federal, addressed nonconsen-
sual pornography. Id. The law’s attention did not shift to “revenge porn” until 2010, when Hunter 
Moore created a “revenge porn” website that allowed users to post sexually explicit images of others 
without their consent, accompanied by other identifying information about the person depicted. Id. As 
of 2013, only Texas, New Jersey, and Alaska had laws that criminalized the conduct of nonconsensual 
pornography perpetrators. Id. at 1280. Between 2012 and 2017, thirty-seven states and Washington, 
D.C. passed new legislation criminalizing this conduct. Id. at 1280–81. 
 245 See 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 6 (listing the 
statutes enacted in 48 states, Washington, D.C., and Guam addressing “revenge porn”); see also Lorelei 
Laird, First Amendment Defense Claims Could Threaten “Revenge Pornography” Statutes, ABA J. 
(Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/first-amendment-defense-claims-could-
threaten-revenge-pornography-statutes [https://perma.cc/FBG3-K8F2] (highlighting that forty-eight 
states now have “revenge porn” laws). 
 246 See 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 6. Few laws 
characterize nonconsensual pornography as a privacy issue and, therefore, do not protect victims 
whose perpetrators act without an intent to harm. See id.; supra notes 129–131 and accompanying text 
(emphasizing the lack of protection that harassment-based nonconsensual pornography laws provide 
to victims); supra notes 135–143 and accompanying text (explaining how privacy-based nonconsen-
sual pornography laws provide more comprehensive protection for all victims). 
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Part III of this Note argues that to adequately protect all victims of non-
consensual pornography, state legislatures must enact content-neutral, privacy-
based laws.247 Section A asserts that the majority of existing laws do not pro-
vide protection to all nonconsensual pornography victims.248 Section B con-
tends that to provide comprehensive protection, states must treat nonconsensu-
al pornography as a privacy issue rather than a harassment issue.249 In addition, 
Part B argues that if states were to enact privacy-based laws, these laws would 
make content-neutral restrictions on speech under existing First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution jurisprudence.250 Finally, Section C concludes that these 
privacy-based laws should withstand constitutional challenges under the First 
Amendment and survive intermediate scrutiny.251 
A. The Need for Privacy-Based Laws 
One in twelve American adults will be a victim of nonconsensual pornog-
raphy in their lifetime.252 Today, nonconsensual pornography affects almost 
twenty-eight million adults.253 Yet under existing laws, almost eighty percent 
of victims are left without recourse through the criminal justice system.254 
State legislatures have made significant strides in recent years by passing legis-
lation regarding nonconsensual pornography, but most laws still do not com-
prehensively cover all victims of these attacks.255 
The most common laws addressing nonconsensual pornography are har-
assment-based laws, containing some variation of an intent-to-harm provi-
sion.256 Although intent-to-harm provisions help statutes easily meet constitu-
                                                                                                                           
 247 See infra notes 252–293 and accompanying text. 
 248 See infra notes 252–267 and accompanying text. 
 249 See infra notes 268–271 and accompanying text. 
 250 See infra notes 272–280 and accompanying text. 
 251 See infra notes 281–293 and accompanying text. 
 252 See Ruvalcaba & Eaton, supra note 7, at 1. Nonconsensual pornography is a phenomenon 
where images are taken originally with the victim’s consent but shared to third parties without con-
sent. Id.; supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text (defining nonconsensual pornography). 
 253 See Ruvalcaba & Eaton, supra note 7, at 1. This calculation flows from the April 2021 U.S. 
population of approximately 330 million people. See U.S. and World Population Clock, supra note 7. 
 254 See EATON ET AL., supra note 12, at 19 (detailing that 80% of individual who have dissemi-
nated a sexually explicit image of another without their consent have done so for reasons other than to 
attempt to cause harm to the person depicted). 
 255 See 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 6; see also Mary 
Ann Franks, The Conversation We Need to Have About “Revenge Porn,” REFINERY29 (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2017/03/147465/revenge-porn-legality-controversy [https://perma.
cc/NP4A-YG9C] (noting that “‘intent to harass’ requirements” limit the conduct criminalized under 
the law). Thirty-six state statutes are written with some variation of an intent-to-harm provision and, 
consequently, inadequately protect all victims. 48 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge 
Porn Laws, supra note 6. 
 256 See Emma Grey Ellis, New York’s Revenge Porn Law Is a Flawed Step Forward, WIRED (July 
24, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/new-york-revenge-porn-law/ [https://perma.cc/D6U9-HAZ2]. 
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tional muster, they fail to protect victims from perpetrators who act without 
harmful motives.257 Harassment-based laws solely punish perpetrators moti-
vated to harm or harass their victims.258 They also require victims to meet the 
criminal burden of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt— to establish that their 
perpetrators acted with such intent.259 As a result, this deters victims from 
seeking criminal charges.260 Even when a victim has some evidence of intent, 
trials for nonconsensual pornography convictions can turn into a he-said-she-
said battle.261 Consequently, harassment-based statutes improperly shift focus 
                                                                                                                           
Some argue that New York’s recently passed statute, featuring an intent-to-harm provision, is a 
“missed opportunity” for protecting victims. Id. The law’s variation of an intent-to-harm provision 
allows many perpetrators’ conduct to go unpunished. Id.; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.15(1)(a) 
(McKinney 2020) (requiring that a perpetrator act with an “intent to cause harm to the emotional, 
financial or physical welfare” of the person depicted in the image). 
 257 See Franks, supra note 255 (explaining that many state nonconsensual pornography laws are 
ineffective, especially when they are limited to perpetrators who intend to harm their victims); supra 
notes 110–113, 120–131 and accompanying text (highlighting that the harassment-focused definition 
of nonconsensual pornography and the limitations of laws that adopt such a definition); infra note 292 
and accompanying text (emphasizing that most incidences of nonconsensual pornography are not 
motivated by the perpetrator’s desire to harm their victim). 
 258 See Ellis, supra note 256 (describing New York’s statute, as a “[f]lawed [s]tep [f]orward” due 
to the legislature’s decision to include an intent-to-harm provision within the law); Heard, supra note 
6 (arguing that intent-to-harm provisions make laws “fall short” in extending protection to all vic-
tims). 
 259 See Avan Schein, Note, When Sharing Is Not Caring: Creating an Effective Criminal Frame-
work Free from Specific Intent Provisions to Better Achieve Justice for Victims of Revenge Pornogra-
phy, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1953, 1957 (2019) (emphasizing that intent-to-harm provisions impose an 
“onerous evidentiary burden” requiring the victim to produce evidence of the perpetrator’s mental 
state); David Migoya, Colorado’s Revenge Porn Law Brings Nearly 200 Charges, but Getting Con-
victions Is a Challenge, DENVER POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/09/25/
colorados-revenge-porn-law-brings-200-charges-convictions-challenge/ [https://web.archive.org/web/
20201208122803/https://www.denverpost.com/2017/09/25/colorados-revenge-porn-law-brings-200-
charges-convictions-challenge/] (highlighting the difficulty to meet the burden of proof for a criminal 
case). 
 260 See Christopher Teters, Etched in Digital Stone: Nonconsensual Pornography in Kansas, and 
a Web That Never Forgets, 87 J. KAN. BAR ASS’N 40, 45 (2018) (stating that crimes requiring specific 
intent of harassment are “notoriously difficult” to meet burdens of proof). Kansas’s nonconsensual 
pornography statute, requiring a perpetrator to act with the “intent to harass, threaten, or intimidate” 
their victim, illustrates the difficulty of proving intent. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101(a)(8) 
(West 2020)). To successfully convict a perpetrator under the Kansas statute, the prosecutor needs to 
prove that the perpetrator acted with this requisite intent. See id. In cases of nonconsensual pornogra-
phy, however, intent is nearly impossible to prove because a perpetrator’s motives can be mixed. 
Steven Yoder, Why Is It So Hard to Write a Decent Revenge Porn Law?, VICE (Aug. 2, 2016), https://
www.vice.com/en/article/kwka43/why-is-it-so-hard-to-write-a-decent-revenge-porn-law [https://
perma.cc/JR4G-WH2H] (noting that most prosecutors believe it is nearly impossible to a perpetrator’s 
intent in “revenge porn” cases). Some statutes have even more constrained intent clauses, such as 
Colorado, which requires additional evidence of the perpetrator’s “intent to cause emotional harm.” 
Teters, supra, at 48; see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107(1)(a) (West 2020). 
 261 See Migoya, supra note 259 (explaining that most of the proof in nonconsensual pornography 
cases relies on the plaintiff’s testimony). 
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to the perpetrator’s intent rather than focusing on the more pressing issue of 
victim’s consent.262 
To protect all victims, legislatures should draft nonconsensual pornogra-
phy laws like other privacy laws that restrict nonconsensual disclosures of pri-
vate information, which do not typically include intent-to-harm provisions.263 
Like other privacy laws, privacy-based nonconsensual pornography laws do 
not contain an intent-to-harm provision.264 As a result, privacy-based laws af-
ford protection to all victims regardless of their perpetrator’s motives.265 To 
prosecute an individual under a privacy-based law, the prosecution only needs 
to prove the victim’s lack of consent to the disclosure and, in some states, that 
the perpetrator knew or should have known the victim had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.266 By reducing the evidentiary hurdles that the prosecution 
must meet, victims, who are typically excluded under harassment-based laws, 
will be able to find recourse through the criminal justice system.267 
                                                                                                                           
 262 Heard, supra note 6. 
 263 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (prohibiting the disclosure of Social Securi-
ty numbers of others without “the prior, written consent of, the individual to whom” the Social Securi-
ty number is assigned unless certain exceptions are met). 
 264 See Citron & Franks, supra note 12. Intent-to-harm provisions are inadequate laws that are 
intended to protect a victim’s privacy rights. Id. If other privacy laws, such as laws protecting disclo-
sure of medical records, had intent-to-harm provisions they would be equally absurd and less effec-
tive. Id.; see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (prohibiting disclosure of Social Security numbers without prior 
consent); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2020) 
(prohibiting disclosure of patient’s medical records without prior consent). 
 265 See Citron & Franks, supra note 12 (urging states like New York to amend their laws to target 
violations of sexual privacy rather than harassment). Id. A privacy-based law would address cases 
where perpetrators act for motives other than the intent to harm. Id.; see supra notes 132–145 and 
accompanying text (illustrating the applicability of a privacy-based law to all instances of nonconsen-
sual pornography, regardless of the perpetrator’s motives). 
 266 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5 (2020) (illustrating a privacy-based law). The Illi-
nois law has only three elements that the prosecution must establish to convict an individual of 
“[n]on-consensual dissemination of a private sexual image”: (1) the actor must have “intentionally 
disseminate[d]” the photo; (2) the actor obtained the photos “under circumstances in which a reasona-
ble person would know or understand that the image was to remain private”; and (3) the actor “knows 
or should have known that the person in the image did not consent to the dissemination” of the image. 
Id. ch. 720, § 11-23.5(b); see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-189c (2020) (same); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(9) (West 2020) (requiring that the prosecution prove that an offending actor was 
“[k]nowingly reprodu[ing], distribut[ing], exhibit[ing], publish[ing], transmit[ting], or otherwise dis-
seminat[ing] a visual depiction of a person who is nude, or who is engaging in sexual conduct . . . 
without the consent of the person depicted”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-17-07.2 (West 2020) 
(requiring the prosecutor to prove that (1) “the depicted individual in the image [did] not give[] con-
sent,” (2) the image was created “under circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy,” and (3) “[a]ctual emotional distress or harm is caused . . . as a result of the distribu-
tion” to meet the burden of proof); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203 (West 2020) (same), amended by 
H.B. 59, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2021), and H.B. 147, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah), and H.B. 
193, 64th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah). 
 267 See Franks, supra note 143, at 1287 (asserting that state legislatures should not limit the laws’ 
applicability to offenders who carry an intent to harm because that type of provision excludes cases 
where the perpetrators did not intend to harm their victims from recourse through the judicial system); 
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B. Privacy-Based Laws as Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech 
Nonconsensual pornography laws that treat dissemination as a privacy is-
sue are content-neutral restrictions on speech.268 The U.S. Supreme Court de-
fines a content-neutral restriction as one that applies to all expression without 
regard to the substance or message of the expression.269 Accordingly, most con-
tent-neutral regulations of speech regulate only the “time, place and manner” of 
speech.270 Privacy-based nonconsensual pornography laws do just that.271 
Nonconsensual pornography laws regulate the manner in which disclo-
sure of sexually explicit images occurs.272 A privacy-based nonconsensual por-
nography law does not make subject-matter distinctions on speech because the 
law applies to all disseminations of sexually explicit images.273 Consensually 
and nonconsensually disseminated images do not differ in their content—both 
contain nude or sexually explicit images of another.274 The only distinction 
privacy-based laws draw is whether the individual in the image gave consent 
before the photo’s dissemination.275 Privacy-based laws allow the dissemina-
                                                                                                                           
Schein, supra note 259, at 1957 (highlighting that intent-to-harm provisions impose “onerous” bur-
dens on the victim to prove the perpetrator’s mental state at the time of the offense). Professor Mary 
Anne Franks, the creator of the CCRI’s Model State Law, asserts that an effective nonconsensual 
pornography law should only establish two elements: (1) knowingly disclosing a private, sexual image 
of an identifiable person and (2) the disclosure is made without consent. Franks, supra note 143, at 
1283–84 (articulating that the mens rea for the second prong should be recklessness). 
 268 See People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439, 457–58 (Ill. 2019) (concluding that a privacy-based 
nonconsensual pornography law was content-neutral), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 233 (2020); Franks, 
supra note 143, at 1318 (same). 
 269 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (defining content-neutral re-
strictions). 
 270 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989) (noting that content-neutral 
restrictions impose “time, place and manner” restrictions on speech); supra notes 45–53, 63–74 and 
accompanying text (discussing the distinction between content-neutral and content-based restrictions 
on speech). 
 271 See Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 457–58 (concluding that the Illinois nonconsensual pornography 
law made a constitutionally permissible content-neutral distinction on speech); supra notes 232–235 
and accompanying text (discussing the factors considered by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. 
Austin in concluding that the statute made a content-neutral restriction on speech). 
 272 See Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 457–58; supra notes 63–74 and accompanying text (explaining how 
content-neutral restrictions on speech can made constitutionally valid “time, place and manner” dis-
tinctions); supra notes 232–235 and accompanying text (emphasizing that nonconsensual pornogra-
phy laws merely regulate whether or not consent was attached to the dissemination, but not the con-
tent of the speech). 
 273 See Franks, supra note 143, at 1318 (explaining that nonconsensual pornography laws do “not 
favor some types of sexually explicit content over others”). 
 274 See id. 
 275 Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 457–58 (highlighting that a content-neutral law’s incidental effect on 
some speakers does not undermine the constitutional validity of the law); Franks, supra note 143, at 
1318. In 2019, in People v. Austin, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that under nonconsensual pornog-
raphy laws, the only speakers affected are those who disseminate sexually explicit images without 
consent, and then it explained that these actors’ speech is incidentally restricted because they do not 
adhere to the legal manner for dissemination. 155 N.E.3d at 457–58. The court emphasized that de-
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tion of sexually explicit images as long as the disseminator has consent to do 
so.276 Thus, the restriction on nonconsensual image dissemination only regu-
lates the manner of dissemination, not the content.277 
Furthermore, privacy-based nonconsensual pornography laws do not cre-
ate viewpoint restrictions on speech.278 Under a privacy-based law, any view-
point on sexually explicit images is permitted.279 These laws only draw distinc-
tions on the manner of the viewpoint’s expression—with or without the sub-
ject’s consent.280 
C. Privacy-Based Laws Survive Constitutional Scrutiny 
Privacy-based nonconsensual pornography laws do not run afoul of the 
First Amendment.281 Because privacy-based laws make content-neutral re-
strictions on the manner in which individuals disseminate sexually explicit im-
ages of another, courts should evaluate their constitutional validity under in-
termediate scrutiny.282 Even if courts choose to apply strict scrutiny to review 
                                                                                                                           
spite the incidental effects privacy-based nonconsensual pornography laws may have on some speak-
ers, they still make content-neutral restrictions on speech. Id.; see Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also 
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 480 (2014). Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has estab-
lished that regulations can be content-neutral even if they have an “incidental effect on some speakers 
or messages but not others.” McCullen, 573 U.S. at 480 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791) (concluding 
that “a facially neutral law does not become content based simply because it may disproportionately 
affect speech on certain topics”); see Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 457–58; supra notes 67–68 and accompa-
nying text (highlighting the Supreme Court’s “incidental effects” doctrine). 
 276 See Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 457 (highlighting that there would be no criminal liability when the 
same sexually explicit image is distributed with consent by the image’s subject). 
 277 See id. (noting that the manner of the image’s publication is crucial to the criminalization of 
the perpetrator’s conduct, not the content of the message). 
 278 See Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 458 (noting that content-neutral restrictions on speech pose a “less 
substantial risk of excising certain . . . viewpoints from public dialogue” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., 
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994))); Franks, supra note 143, at 1318 (stating that nonconsensual 
pornography laws do not require that sexually explicit images carry a certain type of message—
favorable or unfavorable—under the law). 
 279 See Franks, supra note 143, at 1318 (asserting that nonconsensual pornography laws are not 
meant to suppress unfavorable viewpoints, but noting that the laws should instead protect the privacy 
of victims). 
 280 See O’Neill, supra note 70 (emphasizing that courts adjudicate and determine that permit 
requirements for protest, parades, and demonstrations are content-neutral). Laws that require permits 
for protests are like laws that require consent. See id. These laws do not regulate the viewpoint of the 
protestors but are merely requiring that the protestors ask for consent, in the form of a permit, before 
publicly expressing those ideas. Id. 
 281 See Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 466 (concluding that the Illinois privacy-based nonconsensual por-
nography law was constitutionally valid); State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, 644 (Minn. 2020) (con-
cluding that Minnesota’s privacy-based nonconsensual pornography law was constitutionally valid); 
infra notes 282–293 and accompanying text. 
 282 Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 456–58 (noting that a privacy-based nonconsensual pornography law 
made “a content-neutral time, place and manner” restriction on speech); see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 
512 U.S. at 642 (requiring that content-neutral restrictions of speech endure intermediate scrutiny by 
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the constitutional validity of privacy-based nonconsensual pornography laws, 
the statutes should still survive.283 Intermediate scrutiny, the proper standard of 
review in these cases, requires content-neutral laws to serve an important or 
substantial governmental interest and allow for reasonable substitute methods 
of communication.284   
It is a traditional exercise of a state’s police power to protect the health 
and security of their citizens.285 By passing broad nonconsensual pornography 
laws, states seek to protect their citizens from harmful and substantial inva-
sions of privacy.286 In keeping with the general understanding of privacy rights, 
the Supreme Court has never declared unconstitutional a restriction of speech 
that protects private individuals from the dissemination of their “purely private 
matter[s].”287 The interest in protecting this right in the context of nonconsen-
sual pornography is compelling because of the nature of the harm associated 
with this type of disclosure.288 State courts have concluded that nonconsensual 
                                                                                                                           
courts); Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 458 (stating that content-neutral laws are subject to an intermediate 
level of scrutiny because they do not pose a “substantial risk” to individuals’ First Amendment rights). 
 283 See Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 641, 44 (concluding that Minnesota’s privacy-based nonconsen-
sual pornography law survived strict scrutiny review and was a valid restriction on speech under the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); see supra notes 197–219 and accompanying text (examin-
ing the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Casillas that upheld the state’s privacy-based 
nonconsensual pornography statute after employing strict scrutiny review). This Note argues in favor 
of the application of intermediate scrutiny in cases where nonconsensual pornography laws are con-
tested under the First Amendment and, as a result, does not provide an analysis of strict scrutiny for 
these statutes; for a full review of the application of strict scrutiny, see Franks, supra note 143, at 
1323–37 (discussing how nonconsensual pornography laws survive a court’s application of strict 
scrutiny). 
 284 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (establishing that the 
inquiry under intermediate scrutiny should focus on whether the regulation serves a government pur-
pose but still allows for “alternative avenues of communication”); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (adding the requirement that the regulation must be “narrowly 
tailored”); supra note 72–82 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s intermediate 
scrutiny standard and the hurdles that content-neutral laws must overcome to withstand a constitution-
al attack). 
 285 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (holding that a law restricting persons from ap-
proaching another individual without their consent outside a health facility was within the state’s 
police power to enact). 
 286 See Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 642 (holding that the state had a compelling government interest 
in protecting its citizens from the harms that result from the “nonconsensual dissemination of private 
sexual images”); Ex parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346, 2018 WL 2228888, at *5, *7 (Tex. Ct. App. May 
16, 2018) (noting that a citizen’s privacy is a “compelling government interest when the privacy inter-
est is substantial and the invasion occurs in an intolerable manner”); State v. VanBuren, 214 A.3d 
791, 800 (Vt. 2019) (articulating the state’s interest in “protecting the privacy, safety, and integrity of 
the victim subject to nonconsensual public dissemination of highly private images”). 
 287 See Austin, 155 N.E.3d at 460–61 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court has never before in-
validated a law that makes restrictions on “purely private matter[s]”). 
 288 Citron & Franks, supra note 8, at 351. The victims of nonconsensual pornography are at risk 
of harassment, solicitations for sex, and threats of sexual assault. Id. at 353. Victims may suffer from 
psychological harms as well. Id. at 351–52. Many victims experience depression, isolation, paranoia, 
and thoughts of suicide. Id.; see Franks, supra note 143, at 1325. The interest a state has in protecting 
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pornography laws implement a state’s interest in protecting the intimate privacy 
of its citizens by prohibiting disclosures of intimate images from the onset.289 
Narrow tailoring under intermediate scrutiny requires that the regulation 
promote a substantial government interest, which would otherwise be “achieved 
less effectively absent the regulation.”290 Without privacy-based nonconsensual 
pornography laws, states’ goals in protecting individuals from this sort of inva-
sion of privacy will be achieved less effectively.291 Lesser restrictive measures, 
like statutes with intent-to-harm provisions, are under inclusive and do not pro-
vide recourse for all victims of the crime.292 Privacy-based laws are the only suf-
ficient means for states to comprehensively protect nonconsensual pornography 
victims from violations of their intimate privacy.293 
                                                                                                                           
victims from this harm is so compelling that privacy-based nonconsensual pornography laws would 
pass even strict scrutiny. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 644 (concluding that Minnesota’s privacy-based 
statutes survived strict scrutiny); Franks, supra note 143, at 1324. These laws are tailored to prevent-
ing the real harms the victims face from such public humiliation and exposure of their naked bodies. 
Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 642–43 (concluding that the state has a significant interest in protecting its 
citizens from this threat to citizen’s well-being); Franks, supra note 143, at 1325. Even existing crimi-
nal laws prohibiting “surveillance and voyeurism” rely on the understanding that there are “dignitary 
[and social] harms” associated with nonconsensual exposures of oneself “in a state of undress or en-
gaged in a sexual activity” that warrant criminal punishment. Franks, supra note 143, at 1325, 1337. 
 289 See People v. Iniguez, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237, 243 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2016) (concluding 
that laws protecting victims from the emotional distress caused by nonconsensual pornography disclo-
sures are a “compelling need of society”); Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439, 460 (noting that other courts have 
found this interest in protecting privacy as compelling); see also Franks, supra note 143, at 1318. 
 290 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 
472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). In 1989, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the U.S. Supreme Court ex-
plained that narrow tailoring under intermediate scrutiny does not require that the law be “the least 
restrictive means” for serving a state’s legitimate interest. Id. at 798. 
 291 See Citron & Franks, supra note 8, at 387 (highlighting that the intent-to-harm provisions 
found within harassment-based laws undermine the state’s ability to protect victim from invasions of 
privacy of this type); Citron & Franks, supra note 12 (noting that intent-to-harm provisions limit the 
law’s application, and the conduct criminalized under them, to perpetrators that act with the intent-to-
harm their victims). 
 292 See Citron & Franks, supra note 12 (noting the need for privacy-based nonconsensual pornog-
raphy laws because existing harassment-based laws do not adequately protect victims); supra notes 
12, 135–138 and accompanying text (emphasizing that most nonconsensual pornography perpetrators 
do not act with the intent to harm their victims, and noting that the laws containing intent-to-harm 
provisions narrow the pools of victims offered recourse through the justice system). As of 2017, em-
pirical evidence indicates that almost 80% of people who disclose private, sexually explicit images 
without consent do so without the explicit motive to harm the person in the image. Citron & Franks, 
supra note 12; see also EATON ET AL., supra note 12, at 19 (articulating these findings). Thus, the 
majority of perpetrators who harm victims lack an intent to harm, and, as a result, victims are left 
remediless under narrowly defined laws. Citron & Franks, supra note 12 (noting that alternative mo-
tives for disseminating sexually explicit photos of others include “to gain social status, to brag, to 
make money, for sexual gratification, or to provide ‘entertainment’”). 
 293 See Citron & Franks, supra note 8, at 387 (arguing that nonconsensual pornography laws 
should focus on the defendant’s disregard for the victim’s privacy expectation); Franks, supra note 
143, at 1283 (suggesting that the real social harm that results from cases of nonconsensual pornogra-
phy is the violation of privacy that every victim faces). Privacy-based laws not only protect more 
victims, but they also promote the expression of private speech. Franks, supra note 143, at 1326. 
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CONCLUSION 
Nonconsensual pornography is rampant in today’s society, affecting more 
than eight percent of Americans.294 Although existing laws attempt to respond 
to this emerging form of cyber-attack, most state legislation is too narrowly 
drawn and fails to provide protection for all victims. In addition, courts have 
invalidated almost all privacy-based nonconsensual pornography laws under 
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. State courts have subjected 
these laws to strict scrutiny under the mistaken view that they appear to be 
content-based regulations. Under this strict mode of analysis, most privacy-
based statutes are unable to survive constitutional challenges. 
Courts continually fail to recognize that privacy-based nonconsensual 
pornography laws only regulate the manner of speech rather than content. Fol-
lowing the Illinois Supreme Court’s lead, courts must reevaluate their focus on 
these laws and understand that privacy-based laws are content-neutral regula-
tions that merely regulate the manner of speech’s expression. With this under-
standing, courts will properly apply intermediate scrutiny to evaluate the valid-
ity of these laws, and more comprehensive protections for “revenge porn” vic-
tims will survive constitutional attacks. 
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Without assurances that private speech will remain private, individuals might begin to censor them-
selves, even when it comes to purely private matters, out of fear for their public disclosure. Id.; see 
Citron & Franks, supra note 8, at 387 (emphasizing that intent-to-harm provisions undermine the 
security individuals feel in their private conversations and will stunt private expression). 
 294 Ruvalcaba & Eaton, supra note 7, at 1 (finding that one in twelve adult Americans are victims 
of nonconsensual pornography). 
 
 
 
